1) Kosovo and South Africa: do they have anything in common?

Verità senza vendetta (Truth without Revenge) is the title of the interesting book by Marcello Flores, professor of Contemporary History at the Università di Siena. It is dedicated to the analysis of the South African experience of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Following a general introduction, it contains a vast selection of the original documents of the Commission. It is important to examine it closely in order to learn what this experience can teach us which may be applied to the situation in Kosovo. A form of apartheid existed in Kosovo, too, that could be considered similar to that in South Africa, with a minority of Serbs (less than 10% of the population) who through violence controlled the situation and imposed their rules over the Albanian majority (almost 90% of the population). They managed this thanks to a so-called "emergency law" (the same name given to the one used in South Africa to maintain apartheid) which was actually a "martial law", of war. At the beginning this apartheid emerged as the will of the government but it was, in reality, endured and accepted by the Albanian population and used as the starting point for their nonviolent resistance. In fact, for example, in the field of education, the Serbian government turned out all the Albanian teachers and students from the public schools. However, later, it would have preferred to readmit them on the condition that they recognised as legal the constitutional modifications imposed on them by force and deception in 1989 and that they agreed to teach or study in the Serbian language (at least in the secondary school classes) and according to the programmes issued by the Serbian Ministry of Education. But the Albanians refused to do this and created a parallel school system, in the Albanian language and with curricula which took up again the curricula that existed before this constitutional change (except for the teaching of the Serbian language which was substituted by English).
Similar behaviour was adopted concerning the changes in governmental administration. The Kosovar Albanians did not accept the above-mentioned constitutional modifications, which had been achieved in a very unconstitutional manner, and they refused to participate in governmental elections. They used their remaining autonomy (deprived of the state characteristics contained in the 1974 Constitution) to set up their own parallel government, with their own elections. These were considered illegal by the Serbian government, but a large majority of the Albanian population took part in the elections, as well as other different ethnic groups such as the Turks and the Gorans. Legislative proposals of the Serbian government, which had not yet been approved, provided for this area, as in South Africa, a double system of separate political-administrative institutions - one for the Albanians and one for the Serbs and other ethnic groups. Both groups would have equal powers, so that no administrative or political decision could be made by the Albanian majority without the agreement of the other ethnic groups. Clearly, the similarities between the Kosovo system and the South African system were remarkable and, as many scholars have pointed out, apartheid existed in Kosovo, too. In both countries great numbers of people have been tortured, killed, abused by their respective law enforcement agents. And in both South Africa and Kosovo the police and paramilitary groups, paid and protected, have committed brutal and unprecedented crimes in order to keep the subordinated group under its yoke and prevent it from raising its head up.
The first big difference lies between the kind of resistance carried out by the majority group of the population. The main movement of the South African black population (the African National Congress - ANC) chose a strategy of armed resistance, even though at the beginning it had tried various nonviolent actions. In fact, in December 1948 when the new president of South Africa, De Klerk, had his first meeting with Mandela, who had been in prison for 27 years, he offered him his freedom in exchange for a unilateral declaration, on behalf of the ANC, of an end to the armed resistance (Flores, p. 15). Mandela refused.
The movement in Kosovo, on the other hand, united against the constitutional violation that had downgraded this area to a simple province of Serbia (1989), decided to carry out nonviolent resistance, even if political parties and movements did not share a unified vision of how this was to be done. Some groups, such as the Parliamentary Party, the second largest group in the 1992 elections, wished for a more active nonviolent resistance (occupation of factories and schools, public demonstrations, etc.) to more openly show the dissatisfaction of the Albanian population in Kosovo. Rugova's majority party (LDK), however, feared that this sort of action would increase the risk of violent reaction by the Serbian police and of open armed clashes. It, therefore, chose a nonviolent strategy of the parallel government, without direct actions. Yet the agreement on nonviolent strategy was total until 1997 when, especially after the Drenica and Racak massacres had been executed by Serbian paramilitary forces, the armed resistance led by the KLA (UCK) became the basic strategy supported by the Albanian population in Kosovo.
This diversity between South Africa and Kosovo was the cause of a much greater number of deaths and victims in the former, even among the supporters of the regime (not only among the whites but also among the black collaborationists, such as the members of the IFP). This fact explains why certain passages in the reports of the Commission of South Africa contains accounts of abuse and human rights violations conducted by both sides - not only by the white government. For a long time in Kosovo human rights violations (killings, mistreatment, imprisonment abuse, kidnappings, etc.) were only carried out against the Albanian population of Kosovo.
The other big difference between the two countries is in the way in which the two systems of apartheid were handled. In South Africa the decision to overcome apartheid and to move towards a democratic system was decided, consensually, according to the wishes of both sides. In 1989 the elected president, De Klerk, opened a period of distension liberating political prisoners and starting talks with Nelson Mandela, the head of the ANC. In February 1990 De Klerk called for "abandoning violence and learning a lesson from the fall of the Communist countries" (Flores, p. 16). This laid the first stone for the transition towards democracy, revoking the emergency legislation and liberating Mandela unconditionally. It also removed the ban on the ANC (African National Congress, Mandela's party) and on other political movements and associations, which had been prohibited up to then. In 1993 De Klerk and Mandela reached an agreement "for a temporary constitution which foresees a non-racist and pluri-party democracy, a charter of rights and an administrative division into nine provinces" and together they were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (Flores, p. 17).
Despite the violence perpetrated especially by the party of black collaborationists of the previous government (IFP) that tried to recreate an atmosphere of war and fracture, in 1994 elections were held in which Mandela's party gained the absolute majority and control of seven out of nine provinces. In May 1994 Mandela was elected president. In December 1995 the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was instituted "to implement the provisions of the National Law of Unity and Reconciliation, which had been approved in July of the same year" (Flores, p.17). In Kosovo attempts to obtain agreements and consensual decisions have failed due to various reasons, which brevity prevents us from analysing here but about which I have written extensively in other books and essays. Apartheid in Kosovo was overcome by means of a war that witnessed atrocious episodes of violence against, above all, the Albanian population. It is true that many of these episodes occurred after the beginning of the war as a reaction of the Serbs, victims of the NATO bombing, particularly since the Serbs felt that the bombing was directly desired by the Albanians, which was also true. Yet it was difficult for the average Albanian citizen to see a connection between the NATO bombings and what was being done to them by the Serbs. They were bodily thrown out of their houses which were then burned, many times one or more of their sons were killed, often their daughters were raped (it has been calculated that approximately 1000 Albanian girls and women were raped by Serbian paramilitary and police forces). They were forced out of their own country to go and live in refugee camps in which the conditions were anything but "civil", in spite of the good will of the organisers. All this has led to hate and anger, lack of desire to forgive and forget or, of course, for reconciliation. And there are so many similar cases that there is serious doubt as to whether the Kosovar Albanians would be willing to accept reconciliation, especially with the members of those paramilitary groups organised by Arkan or by Secelj that committed most of those crimes. More than for forgiveness and reconciliation they are demanding justice. And this is true in spite of the fact that in 1990 there was a beautiful movement of reconciliation that witnessed "remitting blood" and mutual forgiveness among 1250 families which had been feuding for years, bound to a pact of vendetta. The principles of forgiveness and reconciliation, which were part of the same law but which had been put aside, were brought forward and reaffirmed. Yet we must not forget that the great majority of these cases of reconciliation were among members of the same Albanian ethnic group who "remitted blood" because they were all victims of the same oppressor: the Serbian government and police forces. Unfortunately, now that peace has returned and KFOR troops are stationed in the area, the news that we hear every day clearly shows that the law of vendetta is still alive and real and that the road to possible reconciliation will be long and difficult. Serbs and Roms (gypsy ethnic groups) considered war criminals or Albanian "collaborationists" considered traitors are being killed by Albanian civilians or by people wearing KLA uniforms (often it is unknown whether they are regular or irregular soldiers). Serbian houses are being burnt, or illegally occupied by Albanian families. A bomb was placed in the Orthodox Church being built on the university campus at Pristina, etc.
Can the experience of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa provide suggestions to help overcome the present situation in Kosovo? Personally, I believe it can and this is the thesis I will attempt to develop in this essay.
The first positive element is that all commissions of the South African type (see the attached synoptic table) originated and were constituted after a dictatorship and during the transition towards a democratic government. These commissions have attempted to expose past crimes - not so much to rekindle hatred as to "create a more humane society...[and] to form the idea of moral responsibility" (Flores, p. 18), as one of the promoters of the South African commission wrote. The Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu, Nobel Peace Prize 1984 and President of the above-mentioned commission, stated that the Commission aimed at “helping our nation to come to terms with its past and, in so doing, reach out to a new future” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission - Final Report, Vol. I, Chapt. 1, Foreword, para. 6). These statements could hold true for Kosovo as well, since the collapse of Milosevi&Mac186;'s dictatorship in the territory of Kosovo has laid the ground for the organisation of an authentic democratic government. Up to now this has been hindered by the difficult conditions in which elections were conducted, by internal dissidence among the various Albanian political parties (which led many of them to boycotting the March 1998 elections), and by the alternative Kosovar government's actual lack of power. However, the historical view presented in the appendix also shows the difficulties encountered in the different areas in continuing the activities of these commissions, which in two cases, that of El Salvador and of Argentina, were used almost exclusively by the parliaments in order to approve the general amnesty for all people who had committed these violations. In the majority of the other cases the commissions have had a sad life due to lack of funds (demonstrating the desire of the new governments to cover up the findings) or due to threats or pressure applied by the people being investigated. This pressure has often led to the interruption of the working of the commissions or, as need be, in order to carry on anyway, to the substitution of a large part of the commissions' components. This problem has arisen especially where the commission was not limited to investigating only violations of human rights of past regimes, as happened in the commission nominated by Unified Germany in its examination of the Stasi, the Communist police force of East Germany. Rather this has happened, as in South Africa, when the commission has also attempted to bring forward violations conducted by the opposition. This opposition, at this point, is often the governing power. An example of these difficulties is the criticism of the ANC towards the South African Commission and its attempts to hamper its progress by preventing its members to testify. The work has proceeded only thanks to its President Tutu's threats to resign and Mandela's support.

2) The experience of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa

Before examining if and how the South African experience could be useful to the situation in Kosovo, it would be helpful to analyse, on the basis of the above-mentioned book by Flores, the activities of this Commission, denominated precisely for "Truth and Reconciliation".
"The main task of the Commission was to reconstruct, in the most complete manner possible, a picture of the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human rights which had occurred between March 1st 1960 (date of the Sharpville massacre during which the police had killed 69 participants at a demonstration held by the opposition and which was followed by the ban on all anti-apartheid organisations) and the end of 1993. The victims were offered the possibility to reveal and tell about the abuse they had been subjected to. Amnesty was guaranteed to all those who gave a full confession of all significant facts linked to actions carried out for political objectives. Measures were provided for granting reparation, rehabilitation and for restoring the human and civil dignity of victims. The results were to be made public and recommendations would be included with the aim to prevent the same human rights violations from happening in the future" (Flores, p. 19).
After a long selection involving many institutions, followed closely and critically by the media and public opinion, the Commission which was nominated on the basis of civil merits and professional and human competencies, was organised into three sub-commissions:
1) Human Rights Violation Committee, 2) Amnesty Committee, 3) Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee. Because of the sheer size of South Africa (1.2 million square kilometres) and the diversity of the areas, the Commission decided to set up a head office, a subregional office and four regional offices. This was done so as to reduce logistic difficulties in carrying out hearings, verbalising depositions, conducting investigations.
The main methods used in gathering information were: 1) hearings (of the victims; of specific events; by special categories - women, children and youth, compulsory national military service; of institutions, of political parties); 2) investigations, to corroborate the testimony, verify its validity and integrate other information; 3) research, through the establishment of an ad hoc department to help in the analysis and elaboration of the immense amount of data, evidence and information gathered. In order to ensure that as much relevant information as possible was gathered from the victims' statements, a protocol was developed which attempted to structure and systematise the evidence given. The protocol was also designed to promote uniformity and consistency in the way statements were taken from victims. Great importance was given to the verbalisation of the testimony, much of which took place under TV spotlights and before the eyes of the press. This aimed not only at gathering information about the violations, but also to help the victims by providing them with an opportunity to speak about their suffering and pain to people who listened sympathetically. Psychological support services were provided for the more serious cases and to help victims express repressed feelings. Once the statements had been recorded, the basic facts of each testimony were corroborated using instruments such as court records, inquest documents, death certificates, newspaper clippings and so on. In addition, regional researchers conducted literature searches and field trips in order to produce briefing documents on the political conflicts that had taken place in areas where gross violations of human rights had occurred.
The Amnesty Commission processed some of the most important sources of information. The applicant made full disclosure of all relevant facts and confessed having acted for exclusively political, not personal, aims. This allowed the amnesty procedures to provide vital insights into the motives and perspectives of perpetrators and offered important evidence regarding the authorisation of gross violations of human rights.
The Commission was able to verify 21,000 cases of human rights violations. This figure, as the Commission itself stated, is definitely inferior to the real situation because many people did not choose to testify due to fear or to not wanting to talk about their experiences. Ninety percent of the people who made statements declaring that they had experienced violations of human rights belonged to the black community. In its final report the Commission wrote: “The predominant portion of gross violations of human rights was committed by the former state through its security and law enforcement agencies. Moreover, the South African state in the period from the late 1970s to early 1990s became involved in activities of a criminal nature when, amongst other things, it knowingly planned, undertook, condoned and covered unlawful acts, including the extra-judicial killings of political opponents and others, inside and outside South Africa.... Evidence placed before the Commission indicates, however, that from the late 1970s, senior politicians - as well as police, national intelligence and defence force leaders - developed a strategy to deal with opposition to the government. This entailed, among other actions, the unlawful killing, within and beyond South Africa, of people whom they perceived as posing a significant challenge to the state’s authority” (TRC Final Report, Vol. 5, chapt.6, para. 77-82).
The Commission's overall conclusion is that the state committed, both inside and outside South Africa, the following human rights violations: torture, kidnapping, severe ill treatment (including sexual abuse, deliberate refusal of medical care, the destruction of houses and offices through arson and sabotage, mutilations). Violations include: the unjustified use of excessive force in situations where less drastic measures could have been adopted to control demonstrations or to arrest suspects; the deliberate manipulation of social divisions with the intention of mobilising one group against another causing violent clashes and riots; the arming, financing and training of foreigners to be used in military actions against other governments in the area; raids outside South African borders with the intention of killing or kidnapping political opponents living abroad; the execution of political opponents; extra-judicial executions in the form of planned homicides carried out by the state, attempted murder, disappearances, kidnappings, ambushes; secret training, arming and financing of paramilitary groups or death squads to be put into action inside the country against government opponents (Ibid. pp. 224-225). Yet many pages are also dedicated to the analysis of the violations carried out by members of the opposition, in particular the Mandela Football Club, headed by the President's former wife belonging to the military wing of the ANC. This group committed gross human rights violations with the creation of certain zones of a "reign of terror" with kidnappings, aggression, serious beatings of people considered traitors of the black cause, mutilations, attempted murder and actual murder of some members of the Club itself. In particular, some passages are dedicated to the description of the use of the so-called "fire collar" used by the blacks against persons of their same race suspected of being traitors or spies. The "fire collar" consisted of twisting a bicycle tire tube around their neck, dousing it with gasoline and setting fire to it causing atrocious suffering and often the death of the targeted person.
Three aspects of the work of the Commission deserve close examination: 1) amnesty, 2) reparation and rehabilitation, 3) reconciliation.
2,1) Amnesty
This is what D. Tutu wrote in his introduction, in reply to criticism of this aspect: “Those who have cared about the future of our country have been worried that the amnesty provision might, amongst other things, encourage impunity because it seemed to sacrifice justice. We believe this view to be incorrect. The amnesty applicant has to admit responsibility for the act for which amnesty is being sought, thus dealing with the matter of impunity. Furthermore, apart from the most exceptional circumstances, the application is dealt with in a public hearing. The applicant must therefore make his admissions in the full glare of publicity. Let us imagine what this means. Often this is the first time that an applicant’s family and community learn that an apparently decent man was, for instance, a callous torturer or a member of a ruthless death squad that assassinated many opponents of the previous regime. There is, therefore, a price to be paid. Public disclosure results in public shaming, and sometimes a marriage may be a sad casualty as well.... Certainly, amnesty cannot be viewed as justice if we think of justice only as retributive and punitive in nature. We believe, however, that there is another kind of justice - a restorative justice which is concerned not so much with punishment as with correcting imbalances, restoring broken relationships - with healing, harmony and reconciliation. Such justice focuses on the experience of victims; hence the importance of reparation” (TRC, Fin. Rep., Vol. I, Chapt. 1, Foreword, para. 35/36)
On this same topic, concerning the case of amnesty granted to one of the most well-known and proudest torturers of the South African police, the editor of the book, Marcello Flores, comments: "The initial doubts, ever-present when amnesty is promoted or effective, remain. Awarding those who have had the courage to confess misdeeds could be a right choice, but a sensation remains that once recognised, the crime, too, is somehow accepted. In any case, the amnesty granted by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was not automatic. The instituted law did not provide for this even though, in spite of the convictions of authoritative commentators, there was no requirement for repentance, confinement, or forgiveness of the victims to guarantee it. But it is also particularly significant if we examine the numbers of the cases where amnesty was granted compared with the number of applications and those cases where amnesty was denied for lack of political motivation or those denied because the whole truth was not revealed in the confessions (Flores, p. 53). Indeed, these figures indicate remarkable strictness on behalf of the Commission. By December 1998, 7,124 applications had been presented. Of these, 48 were withdrawn; 2,686 were refused amnesty because of lack of political objective; 45 were refused due to personal gain aims; 160 were refused because their guilt was denied; 91 were refused because they did not present full disclosure; 300 were refused for lack of political objective and for personal gain; 212 were refused for lack of political objective and for denied guilt; 1 was denied amnesty because acquitted; 127 were refused because no offence was specified; 299 were refused because outside jurisdiction; 565 were denied because they applied after the cut-off date; 216 were granted amnesty and 337 cases are still being decided. The decisions made number 5111; those still under examination number 2013 (Flores, p. 63).
Despite the risk mentioned above of even brutal crimes becoming accepted as normal, or not punishable, Flores judges the work of the Commission very favourably. In fact he writes: "The TRC is not only, as has been controversially said, a sort of public confessional where in exchange for a full confession - but not of repentance - one obtains guarantee of immunity... The TRC managed to set up a kind of virtuous circle in which we find woven and nourished fear and atonement, remorse and repentance, threat and recompense and whose principle objective is to track down as much truth as possible... The choice to focus on truth rather than on justice as the framework of the process of revisiting the past means giving an important role to amnesty, but by no means a central or unique role, in spite of the controversy that has arisen. Value must be give to the episodes experienced, the introjected perception, the truth hinged on the single narration and the myth hidden in the collective memory" (Flores, pp. 54-55). A philosopher and human rights activist in Chile, who was on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in his country and also collaborated in the constitutional phase of the South African TRC, said: "Sometimes it is necessary to choose between truth and justice. We choose truth. The truth will not bring the dead back to life, but it releases them from silence... Identity is memory. Identities forged on half-truths or false testimony easily transgress" (Ibid. p. 55). In commenting the work of the Commission, Flores continues: "International observers agreed that they had never seen, at the end of any previous conflict - nor in analogous trials or commissions - such a high number of people responsible for crimes from both sides of the conflict admit to committing human rights violations and tell in such detail how they had done them" (Ibid. p. 54). As a scholar of this phenomena stated in a conference in Washington: "Along with the hearings dedicated to the victims, this constant wave of disclosure, suffering and occasional plea for forgiveness is having a tremendous impact on the society and causing fundamental changes in the way in which a country understands its own history" (Ibid.). And at the end of this paragraph, it seems appropriate to quote Tutu from his introduction to the Commission: "'Those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it’ are the words emblazoned at the entrance to the museum in the former concentration camp of Dachau. They are words we would do well to keep ever in mind. However painful the experience, the wounds of the past must not be allowed to fester. They must be opened. They must be cleansed. And balm must be poured on them so they can heal. This is not to be obsessed with the past. It is to take care that the past is properly dealt with for the sake of the future” (TRC. Final Report, Vol. I, chapt.1, Foreword, para. 27).
2.2) Reparation and rehabilitation
This is another question that it will be useful to analyse before examining the ways in which the South African experience might be useful for Kosovo. The report of the Commission, in the chapter dedicated to “Reparation and Rehabilitation Policy”, begins: "During the period under review, the majority of South Africans were denied their fundamental rights, including the right to vote and the right to access to appropriate education, adequate housing, accessible health care and proper sanitation. Those who opposed apartheid were subjected to various forms of repression. Many organisations and individuals in opposition to the former state were banned and banished, protest marches were dispersed, freedom of speech was curtailed, and thousands were detained and imprisoned. This gave rise to tremendous frustration and anger amongst the disenfranchised. Soon, each act of repression by the state gave rise to a reciprocal act of resistance. The South African conflict spiralled out of control resulting in horrific acts of violence and human rights abuses on all sides of the conflict. No section of society escaped these acts and abuses” (TRC. Final Report, Vol. V, chapt. 5, para. 1).
From this premise, the Commission declared the necessity of reparation: “Victims of human rights abuses have suffered a multiplicity of losses and therefore have the right to reparation. Without adequate reparation and rehabilitation measures, there can be no healing or reconciliation.... reparation is essential to counterbalance amnesty. The granting of amnesty denies victims the right to institute civil claims against perpetrators. The government should thus accept responsibility for reparation..... Without adequate reparation and rehabilitation measures, there can be no healing and reconciliation, either at an individual or a community level. Comprehensive forms of reparation should also be implemented to restore the physical and mental well being of victims” (TRC. Final Report, Vol. V, Chapt. 5, para. 2-3-21).
The various forms this reparation can take are: 1) Urgent interim Reparation: a form of “assistance for people in urgent need, to provide them with access to appropriate services and facilities”; 2) Individual Reparation Grants: the Commission recommends “that each victim of a gross human rights violation receive a financial grant, according to various criteria, paid over a period of six years”; 3) Symbolic reparation/legal and administrative measures: the former are “measures to facilitate the communal process of remembering and commemorating the pain and victories of the past” (for example, through the erection of memorials, monuments, museums, or identifying a national day of remembrance and reconciliation), and the latter to assist victims in practical matters (such as obtaining certificates, legal assistance, etc.); 4)Community rehabilitation programmes: the Commission proposes the establishment of community-based services and activities "aimed at promoting the healing and recovery of individuals and communities that have been affected by human rights violations”; 5) Institutional reform: these proposal include legal, administrative and institutional measures designed to prevent the recurrence of human rights abuses. (TRC. Final Report, Vol. V, chapt. 5, para. 24,25,26,27,28,29,30,32). The report continues giving exact indications as to who is entitled to these forms of reparation.
2.3) Reconciliation
In the conclusion of its work, besides what has already been said about the responsibility of the state during the years examined, the Commission concerned itself with trying to understand the environmental and institutional conditions which enabled these violations. It examined the "cold war" atmosphere and the continuing struggle against communism, the apartheid context and colonial policy protracted by the party in power, the ideology of racism, which tended to view "the others", black people, as different, less capable and intelligent, in need, therefore of "separate development". The Commission did not examine these aspects in order to justify human rights violations, but rather so as to distinguish individual responsibility from collective responsibility. “While acts of gross violations of human rights may be regarded as demonic", the above-mentioned chapter states, "it is counterproductive to regard persons who perpetrated those acts as necessarily demonic. The work of the Commission towards reconciliation would be useless if such a stance were to be upheld” ( TRC. Final Report, Vol. V, Chapt. 6, para. 55). This means that the Commission believed in the possibility that, at least in some cases, the persons responsible for the violations could also be considered victims who let themselves be dragged into doing what they did because of the influence of these environmental and institutional conditions.
Even though the premises for subsequent reconciliation were already laid out in this attempt to comprehend the reasoning of those who had committed gross human rights violations, this comes out even clearer in the final recommendations of the Commission's Report in the chapter dealing with the commitment to reconciliation and national unity:
“The Commission, believing that reconciliation is a process vital and necessary for enduring peace and stability invites fellow South Africans to: - accept our need for healing: reach out to fellow South Africans in a spirit of tolerance and understanding; work actively to build bridges across the divisions of language, faith and history; - strive constantly, in the process of transformation, to be sensitive to the needs of those groups which have been particularly disadvantaged in the past, specifically women and children; - encourage a culture of debate so that, together, we can resolve the pressing issues of our time; - initiate programmes of action in our own spheres of interest and influence, whether it be education, religion, business, labour, arts or politics, so that the process of reconciliation can be implemented from a grassroots level; - address the reality of ongoing racial discrimination and work towards a non-racial society; - call upon leaders in local, provincial and national government to place the goal of reconciliation and unity at the top of their respective agendas” (TRC. Final Report, Vol. V, Chapt. 8, Introd.).
The Commission then makes a request to the President of South Africa to call a National Summit on Reconciliation to evaluate progress on its recommendations and to guarantee maximum involvement by representatives of all sectors of the society in the pursuit of reconciliation.
Responding to the criticism that it had been working more for truth than for reconciliation, the Commission answers that: “While truth may not always lead to reconciliation, there can be no genuine, lasting reconciliation without truth” (TRC. Final Report, Vol. V, Chapt. 8, para. 5). However, in order to reach reconciliation - the Recommendations continue - steps must be taken by all sectors of the population. A strong human rights culture must be developed. The government must develop a project to enable those who benefited from apartheid policies to contribute towards the alleviation of poverty, for example through a wealth tax. To address the unacceptably high rate of serious crime, the government is requested to give consideration to the introduction of community policing. Special archives should be set up in order to preserve and protect all the materials already gathered and others which might become available in the future.
The Commission then examined the instrument of lustration, i.e. the disqualification of those who have committed certain gross human rights violations from certain categories of public office or their removal from office, as has been applied in other countries. After having weighed the pros and cons, it was decided not to recommend it because “it was felt that it would be inappropriate in the South African context” (TRC. Final Report, Vol. V, Chapt. 8, Para. 19). It is suggested, however, that when making appointments and recommendations, political parties and the state “should take into consideration the disclosures made in the course of the Commission’s work” (TRC, Final, Report, Vol. I, Chapt. 1, Prg. 11, Foreword by D. Tutu).
Several positive experiences of reconciliation are then described. The first one was between two neighbouring cities whose inhabitants had been involved in bitter reciprocal conflict. The commitment to reconciliation started with a vast inter-religious service during which the population of the two cities pledged reconciliation and a peaceful co-existence, a ceremony which marked the beginning of a process through which the population of the two towns reached a higher level of acceptance of the past and a more satisfactory level of mutual tolerance. The second experience described is that of the Faculty of Health Sciences at a South African university. A Commission for Reconciliation was established in the Faculty with the objective of documenting the ways in which the Faculty, in the past, had been involved in the processes of racial discrimination as well as documenting some teachers' attempts to resist this policy and how they, too, were discriminated against. The final goal was to open the way to an internal process of reconciliation both among the teachers and among the students.
In finishing this analysis, I feel it is important to quote the conclusion of the Report, in the chapter on Reconciliation: “The work of the Commission dispels the ‘myth that things can be done with magic dust, to bring people together and then just start working together. There are stages, actually, in reconciliation’. The following stages or signposts on the reconciliation road have been highlighted by this chapter: Reconciliation does not come easily. It requires persistence. It takes time. Reconciliation is based on respect for our common humanity. Reconciliation involves a form of restorative justice which does not seek revenge, nor does it seek impunity. In restoring the perpetrator to society, a milieu needs to emerge within which he or she may contribute to the building of democracy, a culture of human rights and political stability. The full disclosure of truth and an understanding of why violations took place encourage forgiveness. Equally important is the readiness to accept responsibility for past human rights violations. Reconciliation does not wipe away the memories of the past. Indeed, it is motivated by a form of memory that stresses the need to remember without debilitating pain, bitterness, revenge, fear or guilt. It understands the vital importance of learning from and redressing past violations for the sake of our shared present and our children’s future. Reconciliation does not necessarily involve forgiveness. It does involve a minimum willingness to co-exist and work for the peaceful handling of continuing differences. Reconciliation requires that all South Africans accept moral and political responsibility for nurturing a culture of human rights and democracy within which political and socio-economic conflicts are addressed both seriously and in a non-violent manner. Reconciliation requires a commitment, especially by those who have benefited and continue to benefit from past discrimination, to the transformation of unjust inequalities and dehumanising poverty” (TRC., Final Report, Vol. V, Chapt. 9, Para.143,144,145,146,147, 148,149,150,151,152).

3) South Africa and Kosovo: what can be learned?

I would first like to eliminate any reader's doubt that I might be trying to teach the Kosovar population a lesson in what they should be doing in their current situation of return to freedom and democracy. I don't believe that I, nor anyone else, is in any position to instruct them in this field. The impressive nonviolent efforts that they carried out against the illicit elimination of the rights they had been given by the 1974 Constitution demonstrate by themselves what a remarkable and constant desire for peace and nonviolence this population possesses. Examples of this are also the actions of the Albanian students in Kosovo to regain their university structures, which should have been returned on the basis of the agreement between Milosevi&Mac186; and Rugova, facilitated by the Comunità di Sant'Egidio of Rome, not applied for more than a year. Or consider the beautiful movement for reconciliation and the overcoming of the tradition of vendetta and for the reaffirmation of the principles of forgiveness and reconciliation, which was part of this same Law, but which had been set aside. The Albanian population in Kosovo has also demonstrated its great capacity to organise massive nonviolent demonstrations, with rare creativity. In 1988 the miners of Trepça fasted against the Serb project to eliminate state prerogatives from the constitution of Kosovo. The following year when the curfew was ordered, the entire population banged on cans with keys to announce that the majority of the population was Albanian and that, sooner or later, they would have the right to open their doors. Consider the Kosovo union workers who had been fired from their jobs marching single-file for one hour every day with the slogan "We are for dialogue, and you?" In 1991 they held the impressive "funeral of violence" to urge all inhabitants of Yugoslavia to look for peaceful methods for all ethnic groups to live together and to solve the general problems of the country and not resort to a "fratricidal" war. At the end of 1997, the university student union of Pristina organised a nonviolent demonstration to demand the disregarded implementation of the agreement signed more than a year before by Milosevi&Mac186; and Rugova. During this demonstration the students read the "commandments" of nonviolent behaviour which is internationally considered one of the most beautiful and mature pieces ever elaborated by university students from any country. In March 1998, with great originality and inventiveness, the Kosovar women held a nonviolent demonstration during which they held up blank sheets of paper asking for the contact group to make some serious decisions concerning Kosovo. Remember the "bread march" when they mobilised to take food to the population of Drenica besieged by Serbian troops and police. Consider also the fact that the International Community, on the other hand, instead of concerning itself seriously with the problems of the area, waited until nonviolence was no longer possible and the two opposing sides arrived at armed clashes, demonstrating, once again, the great lack of interest in preventing armed conflict and a total incomprehension of the language of nonviolence. I always think of what a friend of mine, a well-known Albanian intellectual, told me when I interviewed him at the end of 1995. I don't remember his precise words, but the sense of what he said was: "We have been fighting for our rights for years using nonviolence. And we still have enough energy to carry forward this struggle for a while longer. But if the International Community won't listen to us and demonstrates to us that it only understands the language of armed violence and not that of nonviolence, we, too, will be forced to take up arms, even if, given the disproportion of strength between us and the Serbs, this could mean the destruction of our people." Total destruction did not happen, but how many people in Kosovo lost their lives, their houses, their relatives or friends because of the International Community's lack of interest and delays in facing the problem?
Because of all this, I do not believe any of us are in a position to teach the population of Kosovo any lessons. They themselves can find the strength and ability to overcome the present situation in their own history and in their traditions. Kosovar friends of mine have defined the current situation as a return to freedom and to peace, but also one of immense confusion: "It is like it was in Texas, the strongest and those without scruples win."
This essay is also my reply to the invitation of some of these friends who have been active in the reconciliation movement led by the unforgettable Anton Cetta - a movement we have tried to make known in Italy, as well. They asked us to assist them in re-presenting and giving new value to their historical experiences in this particular reality in which the war has caused mutual hate to flare up and in which the possibilities of living side by side are greatly reduced, while the desire for revenge by the Albanian Kosovars, who see themselves as finally liberated from their oppressors, is substantial. The South African experience seems to be particularly interesting and educational in this light, given the similarity of the two systems of "apartheid". However, in order to permit the Albanian Kosovars themselves to draw possible useful information from this experience, I have dedicated ample space to the illustration and description of it, explaining the reasons, working methods, results obtained and its limits. What follows aims at being my modest contribution, as a sociologist, to a comparison between the two situations to start to see how this could be useful to the current situation in Kosovo.
We have already examined similarities and differences. Let's look at them again. The main similarities are that for many years both countries had a regime of "apartheid" which witnessed serious crimes and constant human rights violations committed by the police, state agencies or paramilitary groups protected by this state, composed of the minority group - whites in South Africa, Serbs in Kosovo. In both countries this situation was overcome (even though in different ways) and the populations have found themselves having to face up to this past in some manner, to expose it, search for forms of reparation for the crimes and the human rights violations perpetrated. The solution adopted by El Salvador and Argentina of a general amnesty would be a total insult for the people who have been killed, tortured, deprived of their houses, for the women raped, etc., etc. Therefore, the problem arises of how to face these crimes which have been committed, if the will exists to interrupt the present trend which seems to be the incrimination of the entire Serbian and Rom populations and a return to the tradition of vendetta, only a few years ago overcome by Anton Cetta's splendid movement. This is revenge without rules against these minority groups, which is causing them to flee en masse from the territory due to not-unjustified fear, given the frequent episodes of killing and kidnapping. Of course, if the Kosovar Albanians' objective is a sort of reverse ethnic cleansing - carried forward first by the Serbs and now by the Albanians - this wouldn't be a problem, but a solution. However, Albanian politicians in Kosovo have always refused this objective and supported a multi-ethnic Kosovo. The International Community does not seem willing to accept this reverse ethnic cleansing either. Therefore, the issue becomes the problem of the search for justice without revenge.
At this point the differences between South Africa and Kosovo come to light. We have already examined two of these: the fact that the oppressed majority in South Africa adopted the strategy of armed violence whereas the nonviolent tactics adopted by Kosovo makes the violations committed by the oppressors there seem even more atrocious. The second difference is the way the regime of "apartheid" was overcome. In South Africa it was through a consensual process; in Kosovo by means of a war during which other, and possibly more serious, crimes were committed, compared with those of the preceding period, and in which the intervention of the International Community was determinant. Another difference is connected to this different process. In South Africa the sense of belonging to the same country prevailed over the differences. Therefore, a strong sense of national unity greatly helped the process of the search for truth and reconciliation, while in Kosovo this doesn't exist. Almost no Albanian Kosovar is willing to accept that autonomy inside Serbia, even temporarily, which was provided for in the Rambouillet agreements signed by the Albanian delegation. And the whole Albanian population of Kosovo considers as valid during the transitory phase not so much autonomy as a regime of international protectorate, which was installed after the war. Another important feature of the process in South Africa, pointed out by the president of the Commission, who speaks of the importance for the reparation of the crimes of the public depositions on television seen by all relatives and acquaintances, is the fact that in South Africa, in spite of the many dialects, the official language, accepted by all, and in which the TV broadcast, was English. In Kosovo there has never been a single official language, with the exception of the Serbs' attempt, after the 1989/90 constitutional modifications, to impose the Serbian language in its cyrillic version, which was never accepted by the Albanian majority. Therefore the connector of a single language is missing and such declarations, in order to have the effect seen in South Africa, would have to be through bilingual television and watched by both Serbs and Albanians. This is not possible at this time. Furthermore, in South Africa the indicted, if they wanted to remain in the country, had to accept testifying in front of the Commission and publicly confess their crimes (if they desired amnesty), otherwise they would have been forced to accept exile or possible judiciary incrimination. In Kosovo the first to spontaneously exile themselves were exactly those groups of police or paramilitary squads and refugees from other territories forced to come to Kosovo and accept being armed and made part of paramilitary groups that committed the greatest part of the crimes. These people certainly have no intention of going back to Kosovo so as to undergo interrogation before a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Hence, a solution of this kind could only come about with a total change of government in Belgrade, with the real democratisation of that country as well, and with bilateral agreements between the new government and that of Kosovo in order to carry forward, together, a process of disclosure of truth and reconciliation. But the conditions for this change do not seem to be present at this moment either in Belgrade or in Kosovo. In fact, in the latter, the Albanian population considers its time of living alongside the Serbian population as over. Another problem underlines the differences as well. South Africa, precisely because of the existence of this unity compared with the differences, was able to allow truth to prevail over justice. The story told by the inveterate South African police torturer who reveals, with almost a sense of pride, all the aspects of his acts without demonstrating any real repentance and who is granted amnesty for having disclosed all the truth, raises up serious doubts about the procedures which privilege truth over justice. These doubts even caused the editor of the book to draw away from this solution, even though he writes of this experience in an extremely positive manner (Flores, p. 53). On the other hand, the Hague International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has already started examining some of these massacres in Kosovo, such as that of Drenica, and has indicted important perpetrators or protagonists of these crimes, such as Milosevi&Mac186; and Arkan. Therefore, the road to "justice" is being followed and rightly so. But is this enough? Will this be sufficient to satisfy the need for revenge for Kosovo's victims of crimes and injustice? Isn't there the risk that it becomes that which Tutu defined the "justice of the winner" (Flores, p. 70) which takes into consideration only the crimes committed by the losing side and not those, even if less numerous, committed by the winners, whether they be Kosovar Albanians or of its KLA (or fringes of this who have escaped the control of its own leadership) or of NATO itself? And will it suffice, under these conditions, to apply exclusively for a "punishing" justice without considering the need to have a "reparative" justice, too, which also takes into account individual situations of those who have been the victims of gross human rights violations? These are only some of the questions raised and to which we will try to offer a first, though temporary, answer while waiting for the Kosovars themselves and the governmental organisations controlling the area to open debate on these issues. Speaking with the Albanians who have been victims of violations, we learn that this form of justice seems too slow to them. It takes years to arrive at a decision, only a few cases are focused on, the other cases are ignored, often the sentences for those convicted, which sometimes are not even carried out since the convicted person has disappeared, appear illusive and inappropriate compared with the crimes committed. For these reasons, many of them have expressed the wish to provide their own justice - the "law of the West", as in the legendary Texas. Flores, the editor of the book we have been examining, provides some sensible criticism in his introduction concerning the "winners' justice". He writes: "On the whole, the results of winner's justice have been, except perhaps on a symbolic level, extremely disappointing. The number of people responsible for having committed the crimes who have paid their due to justice, is ridiculously small, in spite of norms whose aim was to cover vast categories of people. The victims did not feel compensated and the persecutors felt overly punished. The social atmosphere seemed peaceful enough but divisions remained which periodically re-emerged with resentment, lacerations and the desire for revenge... The excessive length of time necessary for judicial procedures and the fact that they are carried out by substantially the same magistrature as in the former regimes have been factors that have greatly contributed to their discredit and their disappointing the expectations induced by the justice wanted by the winners (Flores, pp. 21-22). "Choosing the judiciary methods has not favoured the indisputable construction of the historical truth, as we have seen from the trials which have been held in the last few years... The choice for judiciary methods, even when justice for the winners is historically possible, makes protagonists out of the criminals and the judges, relegating the victims to a position of insignificance... the accused have all the rights guaranteed for defence in a legal state, which often translates into postponement, more attention being given to procedural formalities than to the substance of the accusation, possibilities to call the victims to the witness-stand using methods that in most cases serve only to place them in a subordinate and passive position and to renew past sufferance" (Ibid. pp. 22-23). These are some of the reasons that lead Flores to recognise the importance and the uniqueness of the work done by the South African Commission, which placed the voices of the victims and their families in the spotlight. They were listened to in every part of the country for six months before allowing their persecutors to speak before the Amnesty Commission (Flores, p. 24).
From what has been said up to now, a proposal could be identified: and that is not to consider the justice proclaimed by the Hague Tribunal and the justice proclaimed by an ad hoc commission for truth as being alternatives to each other, but rather as being complementary. The International Tribunal should be kept open to judge serious, systematic crimes and human rights violations committed by people who have rarely stayed in Kosovo and who must be traced down in Serbia or in other allied countries. On the other hand, a Commission for Truth and Justice in Kosovo should be established whose participants are members of the Pristina Council for Human Rights and Freedom, which has worked so hard in these years to gather testimony from the victims of abuse by the Serbian police and paramilitary forces. Other participants should come from the Belgrade Foundation for Humanitarian Law, which, besides the above, has also gathered data on abuse of the Serbian and other minority groups in Kosovo. This Commission should also contain important representatives from the international community, such as members of Amnesty International or HCA, who have dealt with these violations in the past and of the Governmental Organisations who handle these issues, especially UNCHR. The Commission should set up hearings for the testimony of the many victims, not only from one side but also from the other, and single out criteria for an eventual individual amnesty, not a collective one, for those who committed minor crimes in doing what they believed to be their duty. They should testify and they should want to stay or return to that same region, where often they were born and raised or where they had lived for many years. Is this an absurd proposal? Mine is a provocation open to confutation, discussion or to alternative proposals. Proposals which are not, however, leaving things as they are now (there is the enormous risk of consistent generalised revenge and maintaining the "law of the West"). Proposals which are not decisions to leave everything in the hands of the Hague Tribunal which will reasonably only be able to judge a limited number of criminals, and not the others, leaving the general population with a sense of frustration and anger and, therefore, the desire to resort to their own personal justice.

Pristina, August 9, 1999

TOP