KOSOVO: A WAR NOT FOUGHT
Alberto L’Abate
Pristina 23 May
2) Recent years and the current situation in Kosovo
4) Possible solutions
4.1) Division of the territory
4.2) A Balkan Confederation?
4.3) Yugoslav Mini-Confederation
4.4) Special autonomy
5) European Civil Peace Corps: a possible solution?
1) Introduction
Kosovo is a region of Former Yugoslavia contiguous to Macedonia toward the South, to Albania and Montenegro toward the East, to Serbia toward the North and East. There are about two million inhabitants, mostly Albanians. This ethnic group refused to participate in the last census, having no trust in the Serbian Government which, according to them, manipulated former censuses; so there is no certain data about the quantity of the population and the Albanian percentage. According to Albanians about 90% of the population is Albanian, considering also 400,000 people who had to go into exile these last years, (among them were many young men who wanted to avoid military service in the Serbian Army). According to the Serbs, who call this territory Kosovo-Metohija, the percentage of Albanians is lower, 81,6 % in 1991 (11, p.17).
Islam is the most widespread religion, mostly because, according to Albanians the Turkish domination which lasted more than 5 centuries in this area forced the Albanians, traditionally Catholics, to accept Islam. A very low percentage (2%) of Albanians remained Catholic and about 8% of the Kosovo population are Orthodox, mostly Serbs.
The conflict between Serbs and Albanians, which even if it has not exploded yet, is present in the form of a military-police occupation by the Serbs (according to Albanians about 60,000, but in the hot moments even 100,000) and has its origin also in a different vision of history.
According to the Serbs this region was, traditionally, Slav, as some of the most beautiful Greek-Orthodox cathedrals and monasteries are found here. They claim the Albanians emigrated here later and thanks both to their connivance first with the Turkish Empire and later with other invaders (the most recent being the Fascists and Nazis) and to their high birth rate (the highest in Europe) Albanians replaced the Serbs, even compelling them to leave. Moreover, just a few kilometres from Pristina, the capital town of Kosovo, in 1389 the local coalized populations were defeated in a famous epical battle by the Turks. “Besides its real historical value, the battle is chanted in many popular Serbian ballads together with episodes and historical personages related to it. So Kosovo has taken on, since then, important symbolic value in the definition of Serbian national identity” (38, p.1). German historical-geographical maps show the presence of Slavic populations in Kosovo since 800 AD (45, Carolingian epoch).
On the contrary, according to Albanians, who bring as evidence the toponymy and the few archeological excavations which have been carried out (which they claim were later covered up by the Serbs), Albanians are the original population descending from the Illyrians who lived in this area from the time of Ancient Greece, and important historical figures, like Alexander the Great and the Roman Emperor Constantine, had Illyrian origins and were born in this area. The word “Albanians” derives from “Albanoi”, the name of an Illyrian tribe. Slavs invaded this area only much later (they speak of the seventh/eighth century) subjugating the Albanian population. And many of the Greek-Orthodox churches were, previously, the Catholic churches transformed by Slavs into Orthodox churches. After the defeat of the Slavs by the Turkish Sultan in 1389, Kosovo became part of the Turkish Empire. In this battle (Kosovo Polje) the Albanians were allied with the Slavs, and even in the Albanian oral literature many songs and ballads recall this event. The Turkish Empire lasted until 1912 when, according to Albanians, their people reconquered the land from the Turks, only to be soon re-occupied by Slavs.
According to the Albanian interpretation, “Christian Europe”, after the defeat of the Turkish Empire, wanted to prevent a Moslem bridgehead in this area. That is why, first with the Conference of Ambassadors in London (1913), and second with the Versailles Treaty (1919), it divided the Albanian people between the states of Albania, which was recognized in 1913 (thanks to the contribution Albanians gave to the fall of the Turkish Empire), Kosovo (which in 1912 became part of the Serbian Kingdom), Macedonia and Montenegro (all parts of what, later, in 1919, would be called Yugoslavia), and, finally, Greece.(48).
Because of this fragmentation the Albanians felt unjustly mistreated, and started to wish to be re-unified in one State which happened, at least for the Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia, only for a few years (1941-44), under the Fascist and then Nazi occupation. “This period, seen favourably by the Albanians as the only time in which their nation lived under the same State, is often remembered by Serbs as an occasion for heavy discrimination against them, as a warning of what would happen to them if Kosovo no longer belonged to Yugoslavia. At the end of the war, when the project of a confederation between Albania and Yugoslavia failed, Kosovo had to become a part of the latter, as an autonomous region of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, not without disappointment on the part of Kosovo Albanians” (38, p.1). This sore disappointment was also based on the fact that the Albanians had participated in the fight for liberation against the Nazi-Fascists and that the representatives of the anti-Fascist combatants (Albanians, Serbs, Montenegrins and Turks) who met in Bujan on 31 Dec. 1943, 1 & 2 Jan. 1944, had unanimously adopted a resolution providing for the possibility of re-uniting Kosovo to Albania, considering that this was “a centuries-old aspiration of the Albanians” (14, pp. 216-221).
Besides a different version of history, the main causes for the break between Albanians and Serbs bringing both to mutually refusing each other’s textbooks and to the Albanians’ claim to the right to use their own language in their schools and to organize their own parallel school system, another important reason of conflict was the 1974 Constitution, that has been defined as Tito’s “masterpiece” and which certainly allowed the different ethnic and religious groups to coexist for many years, at least until the death of this political leader.
Undoubtedly, with the approval of this Constitution, the Albanian nationalist movement (which, in 1968, starting as a student movement, often held demonstrations, claiming the status of the Seventh Republic of the Yugoslavian Federation), lost many of its purposes and members. The Constitution recognised six states as constituent members of the Yugoslavian Federation (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro) and two autonomous provinces of Serbia: Kosovo and Vojvodina. To these last two was given what has been called the status of “a state within a state” (39, p.5). They were allowed to participate in the Presidency of the Federation and to be elected in turns as its President. They had a fixed number of seats in the Federal Assembly (20 instead of the 30 of the States), and the right to veto all questions concerning their territory. This ambiguous situation of Region-State was one of the main causes of the present conflict and worsened after Tito’s death.
As a matter of fact, the Albanian population of Kosovo, basing its request on the fact that it was, numerically, the third ethnic group in Yugoslavia (after the Serbs and the Croats), repeatedly asked to become a State in the full sense of the word and to be recognised as the Seventh Republic. The most significant demonstrations aimed at this were held in 1981, soon after Tito’s death. According to the Albanians interviewed, the objective of the demonstrations were those cited above, but the Serbs succeeded, through their propaganda, in presenting those initiatives as “secessionist” aimed at unification with Albania, and in convincing the other Republics to accept the “state of emergency”, declared by the Federal Government, and a ferocious military repression that caused many victims among the Albanian demonstrators (from official data 8, according to the Albanians many more), and the arrest and conviction to imprisonment of many intellectuals who had participated in the demonstrations.
The Serbian Government which, during Tito’s life, had to unwillingly support the Federal Constitution, tried to modify the Constitution after Tito’s death to bring Kosovo and Vojvodina back to the status of Regions enjoying less autonomy, thus taking away the character of Federal members with all the prerogatives connected. This movement against the Constitution developed not only at the legislative level, but, first of all, through mass demonstrations organized by Milosevic - Secretary of the Communist League of Serbia, which later became the “Serbian Socialist Party” - and his supporters. These started in Belgrade with a large demonstration (19 Nov. 1988) in which about one million Serbs participated.
Their main slogans were: “We’ve had enough: stop with compromises, with a state that allows 12 million Serbs to be overpowered by others, having the same political representation as 2 million Slovenians, or 600,000 Montenegrins. Stop the exploitation by Slovenia, that comes here to buy raw materials and sells finished products at very high prices. Stop with Regime parasites, with managers and bureaucrats of the Party who ruin factories. Enough with Croats and Bosnians, who, through the rotation of political positions, come to Belgrade to occupy government buildings and to collect salaries. Workers protesting in the streets are right. We have had enough of the Albanians, the “traitors” of Kosovo who threaten Serbian brothers, compelling them to leave their homes, lands, sacred places where Serbs have sacrificed generations of fighters (of “vojvode”) in order to defend Europe from the Turks. It’s time for new policies, a new democracy that respects numbers (“each man one vote”), a new state, a new socialist and progressive power. “Idemo na Kosovo”, “let’s go to Kosovo”, the crowd shouted, arms raised towards the sky. The first front is open ....... Now brotherhood has been thrown out of the programmes of this meeting” (15, p.12). Other direct sources added that one of the more common slogans was “Give us arms!”. According to many analysts of recent Yugoslav wars, this was the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict which would become, not much later, an armed conflict, one of the most ferocious of this century. The first occasion and cause of the conflict was, therefore, Kosovo. The other Yugoslav States, in fact, accepted and even participated in the fierce repressions of 1989 in this region. But when they became aware that Serbia wanted to revise the 1974 Constitution not only regarding Kosovo (and Vojvodina, the other Region-State), but also concerning them, and that the movement for a “Great Serbia” (launched by Milosevic at the Belgrade demonstration and, then, more clearly, at the demonstration in the “Blackbirds’ Plain” of Kosovo, where on 28 June 1989 Milosevic spoke of the “unity of all Serbs and of new borders, because ‘where a Serb lives, there is Serbia’”) (15, p.14) threatened their very existence as states, because of enclaves or areas in them with a majority of Serbs, they chose independence and dissolution of the Federation which already could not function because of the elimination, by force, of the Kosovo Parliament. From here started the popular saying, related to the war in Yugoslavia: “Everything started with Kosovo, and everything will finish with Kosovo”.
2) Recent years and the current situation in Kosovo
As a first act of conquering Kosovo (as promised during the Belgrade demonstration), Milosevic brought to approval, in that same year, some constitutional changes that greatly reduced the autonomy of Kosovo, and ordered the arrest of E. Vllasi, General Secretary of the Kosovo Communist Party, an Albanian strongly opposed to the attack on Tito’s Constitution, and who fought for the maintenance of the autonomy of the Region. He was charged with “conspiracy against the State”. The same thing happened to other Albanian leaders considered “counter-revolutionaries”. Vllasi and other Kosovo party leaders were replaced with persons trusted by Milosevic whom Albanians define as his puppets. Albanian reaction was not long in coming: marches, demonstrations (Nov. 1988), and strikes. The most important strike was that of the miners of Trepça (Feb. 1989): 1300 miners of one of the biggest Kosovo mines near Mitroviça, proclaimed a total fast and barricaded themselves in the mine tunnels, demanding autonomy for the Region and the release of the Communist leaders. After eight days they came out of the mine in very bad shape; some of them had to be urgently taken to the hospital (40, p.38).
But the nonviolent resistance had already begun: marches from Trepça and Peja to Pristina where hundreds of thousands of Albanians marched to defend autonomy, frequent demonstrations to protest against the attack on their autonomy, mass desertion from the Communist Party which wasn’t respecting the people’s rights, are all examples of this struggle that, initially spontaneously, later in a declared way (38, p.2), would be clearly “nonviolent”. But to these nonviolent demonstrations the Federal Government answered with new arrests and with what an Italian journalist defined as “the most violent repression enacted in modern Yugoslavia. On the trees of the main street of Pristina mourning notices listed the names of those who had died during the clashes with the police. But not all of them were listed. Many were buried secretly, in order to protect their families” (15, p.13).
Later the “state of emergency” was proclaimed (March 1990) to prevent street assemblages and a curfew was established for 9 p.m. But the Albanians signed a mass petition against violence and requesting democracy and gathered in hundreds of thousands in the streets of the towns, for five minutes, in memory of their dead. Many of them, in the evening, at curfew time, turned off the lights, went on their terraces or to their windows and rattled keys against tins in order to be heard and express the fact that, in spite of the ‘state of emergency’, ‘the keys of the problem lie in their hands’ because they are the majority of the population in Kosovo “ (28, pp.86-87).
The clashes between the Albanians and the Serbian Government became more and more serious. To the proclamations of independence and demonstrations protesting against the removal of their autonomies, the Serbian Government responded by reducing their autonomy even more, removing also the right to veto. S. Ginzburg reported: “Approval by the Kosovo Parliament (needed for the last time) was obtained in a situation of great uproar and tension with tanks just outside the hall. Afterwards, violent clashes caused 24 deaths. Furthermore, a series of laws in favour of the immigration of Serbs to the region were promulgated and the Albanian language was no longer allowed for official documents” (38, p.2). On the 2nd of July 1990, the Albanian members of the Kosovo Parliament gathered in front of it (since they were not allowed to enter), and unilaterally proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of Kosovo as member of the Yugoslavian Federation. The reply from Belgrade authorities was the dismissal of both the Parliament and the Government of the Province (5 July 1990). The Albanian members of the dismissed Parliament answered by secretly meeting in Kaçanic (7 Sept. 1990) and proclaiming the “Constitution” of the Republic of Kosovo (in Albanian: Kosova). The Serbian Government approved a new Constitution of Serbia (28 Sept. 1990) which removed the right to veto from the elective assemblies of the autonomous Provinces and almost totally deprived them of their former autonomy (51, pp. 132-148).
Kosovo remained, from the beginning of the state of emergency, under occupation. If the conflict didn’t explode, it was thanks to the Albanians’ choice of nonviolence. S. Maliqi, Kosovo Albanian journalist wrote: “The opting of Albanian politicians for nonviolent resistance, as well as other specific circumstances, primarily the concurrent wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, to which nearly the entire Serbian military potential was committed, have thus far prevented war from breaking out in Kosovo. But essentially, it has only been postponed, since nothing has been done to prevent it. The ethnic conflict in Kosovo has therefore assumed the form of an intensive war of nerves, in which one party stops at nothing in its brutal violations of human rights and freedom, indifferent to the strong protests of international organisations which have special missions in Kosovo to monitor the violations of human rights, while the other party suffers humiliation and restrains itself, accumulating more and more despair, but also rage and hatred that threaten to explode” (43, p.124).
In 1990 and 1991 the military occupation of Kosovo was extended to factories, newspapers, the University, to all public places, and to all political, juridical, administrative offices from which Albanians were dismissed, to be replaced almost exclusively by Serbs. Workers in factories and teachers at all levels of schools were requested to sign a declaration of loyalty to the Serbian Government (this is denied by many Serbian authorities, but it is confirmed by many Albanians). If they didn’t sign, they were dismissed. According to the Albanians about 150,000 Albanians were dismissed from various occupations: factories, post offices, banks, schools, libraries, etc. But it’s certain that at least some of them spontaneously left their jobs, following the suggestions of Trade Unions, in order to protest against the dismissal of their colleagues.
Even more dramatic is what happened in the schools: in Dec. 1990 the Faculty of Medicine was closed; rules about education were changed. Teaching in the Albanian language was abolished and history was to be taught according to Serbian, not Albanian, canons because the latter are considered biased by a nationalistic view (which may be partially true, but the Albanians say the same thing of the Serbian curricula). In June 1991 in the University all Albanian Deans and management staff were suspended, and the number of Albanian students who could enter University was so greatly reduced that there were more Serbian than Albanian University students. Since Sept. - Oct. 1991 teachers of the Albanian language and history are required to teach in the Serbian Language and according to the instructions of the Ministry of Education of the Serbian Government. Teachers that refuse to do so (almost all) don’t receive their salaries. Students and professors organised a protest and were beaten in Oct. 1991 (28, p.40). For a few months the other Albanian teachers of all subjects, shared their wages with these colleagues. But not much later they were dismissed and access to all schools and even to the University was forbidden to Albanian students.
In Sept.-Oct. 1992 thousands of students and professors marched through the streets of Pristina demanding the reopening of schools to Albanian students. They tried to enter the University and secondary schools, but the Police obstructed them.. In this case, as well, the response of the Serbian government was repression (28, p.40).
After some months without schools the Albanians decided to start their own school institutions, asking citizens to offer rooms in their homes. In this way a parallel school system started which is still going on. Albania, some other European countries (like Austria, Germany, Great Britain) and even the United States recognize, even if only partially, the studies carried out in these schools and university (28, p.40). Not until a couple of years later, due to international pressure, students belonging to parallel elementary schools were partially “sheltered” in public schools (particularly for compulsory school level) but in a very unfair way because most classrooms are used by Serbian students and only a small part by Albanians. So the latter are obliged to attend school in shifts (even 4 or 5 per day, ending, in some cases, at 8 p.m). The Albanian teachers, even at compulsory school level, having not received salaries for 5 years from the Serbian Government “can only survive owing to a symbolic compensation provided by our citizens, by those working abroad in the first place” (46, p. 2). .Also part of the heating, cleaning costs, etc, are paid for by the Parallel Government.
Similarly, regarding Health and Social Assistance, after the dismissal of Albanian doctors from public institutions Albanians created a parallel socio-sanitary system, thanks to a voluntary organisation inspired by Mother Teresa, who is of Kosovo Albanian origin. The nonviolent resistance of the Albanian people during 5 years of occupation would have certainly been impossible without these parallel institutions and the family solidarity, which is typical in Albanian families (41, pp. 117-121; 28, pp. 73-77). The parallel taxation system (3 %), proposed by the parallel Albanian Government, though having no means of imposing it, is voluntarily adhered to by about 75% of the Albanians working in Kosovo or abroad, and has been another important element that has permitted resistance.
Another fundamental moment of this resistance was the Referendum (Sept. ‘91) by which the Kosovo population was asked whether it wished to remain with Serbia, as an autonomous region, or whether it wanted independence. A very large majority of Albanians voted in favour of independence.
Elections, which were not recognized by the Serbian Government, were held on 24 May 1992, in the presence of foreign delegations. These led to the appointment of a new Parliament and of Ibraim Rugova, a highly regarded Albanian researcher, at that time President of the Albanian Writers Association, and leader of the “Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)”, as President of the Kosovo Republic.
At the same time an immense nonviolent demonstration was held, attended by about 200.000 people, called the “funeral of violence”, similar to a traditional funeral where a coffin representing violence was symbolically buried (28, p. 87).
In spite of continuous persecution endured by Albanians (arbitrary arrests, abuse, killings), partly documented by the “Council for the Defence of Human Rights in Kosovo (headed by the receiver of the Sacharov Award of the European Parliament, A. Demaçi) and recognized in the documents of Amnesty International and by the United Nations Commission for Human Rights (53, pp.68-72), and notwithstanding the long presence in the area of the savage paramilitary forces of the notorious Arkan - a war criminal denounced to the The Hague Tribunal - the recommendations of the Parallel Albanian Government not to accept provocations and not to respond to Serbian violence with counter-violence has been maintained. This has prevented violence from exploding up to now, and it has prevented latent war from changing into an armed conflict. But the situation is still very tense. The separation between the Albanian and Serbian communities in Kosovo is so sharp that some have defined the present situation as an “apartheid” (11, p, 282).
A recent survey by the USIA (United States Information Agency) carried out in Kosovo on 1015 inhabitants of this area (748 Albanians, 253 Serbs, and 14 of other ethnical groups) revealed a complete split: 92% of Albanians are in favour of independence and 81% are against the autonomy of the region inside Serbia, while, on the contrary, 99% of Serbs are against independence and 67% contrary even to the autonomy of the Region. The only difference between the Serbs and the Albanians is in the level of involvement: while Albanians are ready to act to reach their wishes, either through a petition (83%), or through participation in demonstrations (85%), and while most of them would be ready to die in order to reach this goal (94%), in the Serbian population the level of involvement is much lower (59% for a petition, and 77% for demonstrations). The report, which is based on a research undertaken between the end of February and the beginning of March ‘96, concludes by pointing out the high risks of the actual situation which could easily explode into an open conflict (37, p. 1).
3) Risks of war breaking out
It has been rightly said that : “Kosova is a powder-keg” (36, 8 May 1996, p. 1; 35, 9 May 1996)., which could explode at any time, no matter who lights the fuse”. The risk of an explosion is now particularly high, since not only Albanians have been killed (according to “Koha” about 100 of them have been killed by Serbs in Kosovo in the last few years), but also Serbs (5), and, among these, also some policemen.
Some newspapers, and the B.B.C., have spoken about a so-called “Kosova Liberation Army” which it said to have claimed responsibility for the bombs placed in some Kraijna Serbian Refugee Camps in February 1996, and for the killings of the policemen and the other Serbs in April ‘96.
The reasons for the worsening of the situation may be many, since it’s possible to interpret the so-called “Kosova Liberation Army” in different ways. The leaders of the LDK, and of the Albanian Christian Democrat Party, state that this Army doesn’t exist, and that it is only a manoeuvre of the Serbian Secret Services to provoke the Albanians, seeking an excuse for “armed” intervention in Kosovo (35, 9 May 1996). If this interpretation is right it would mean that the Serbian regime is taking advantage of the internationally favourable moment, after Dayton and the recognition of the F.R.Y. by many countries of the European Community, and in that way it is trying to completely destroy the Albanian opposition depriving it of the esteem it has gained for its nonviolent strategy, and presenting it, instead, as a nest of terrorists (ibid.). If, on the contrary, this “Army” does exist, as other members of the Albanian opposition don’t exclude, like Demaçi (ibid.) and Surroi (in an interview we had with him), this means that the Albanians are getting tired of the nonviolent strategy, or at least of the way it has been developed by the LDK (ibid.), mostly for two important reasons: because both the support promised to them by other countries for their nonviolent choice, and the European Parliament’s pledge to recognize the FRY only after Serbia solved the Kosovo problem, were not upheld (32, pp. 4-5). On the contrary, the International Community, through the Dayton Agreements, has given value to the armed struggle of Serb-Bosnians, by recognizing, even if only partially, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia (35, 30 April 1996, p. 1; 35, 8 May 1996, p. 1). This has led many Albanians to sustain that leading countries “understand only the language of arms and not that of nonviolence” (27, p. 18), and to think, therefore, that, if this attitude persists, they will be “forced” to use arms although it would most probably be unfavourable to them, because of the disparity between the opposing forces (ibid.)
According to many Albanians, and also to some Serbs, the historical issue is only a pretext, and the real problem is that the strategic position of Kosovo is so important that Serbia can’t easily give it up or even accept a form of real autonomy. Kosovo borders on Macedonia which, although recently recognized by the F.R.Y., was up to a short time ago, directly opposed to it, claiming the “Former Yugoslavian heredity”. But, above all, Kosovo borders on Albania which is militarily allied with Turkey against Serbia. And the fact that also among Kosovo Albanians there is the widespread longing for the reunification of all Albanians under the same state (28, p. 93; 37, p. 1), in sharp contrast with Milosevic’s programme for the “Great Serbia”, which makes the problem of the independence or autonomy or Kosovo even more difficult to solve, from a strategic point of view.
Besides this, geographically in this area, there are the mountains which separate the Kosovo plain from Albania and from Macedonia, which is the only natural protection in case of conflict with these countries. For these geo-military reasons, according to Serbian democratic researchers (particularly D. Janjic), Serbia “cannot” give up Kosovo.
On the other side, Albanians also are not willing to give up easily. In fact, besides their historical claim as descendents from the Illyrians, they point out that the 1974 Constitution gave to Kosovo the status of member constituent of the Yugoslavian Federation, with all connected rights, and that this Constitution was cancelled through military intervention, and not through the will of both parts. This annulment is, therefore, “illegal”, according to Albanians, and totally in contrast with the principle of people’s self-determination which is fundamental for the Constitutional Charter of the United Nations. Hence comes their appeal to the International Community to intervene as a third party in order to stop the Serbian military occupation and to re-establish freedom and the right to “self-determination”.
The situation is becoming more and more at risk: besides the lack of mutual communication (children of both communities, for example, cannot communicate verbally because, since 1990, the Albanian children have stopped learning the Serbian language), the Dayton agreements have recognised, in reality even if not juridically, the principle of “ethnic cleansing”. After Dayton, in fact, the Serbian Government has intensified both the calling of Albanian men to military service, thus further stimulating their emigration abroad (since many young Albanians have died during military service because of so-called “accidents”), and the colonisation of the area with Serbian refugees from Krajina, who, according to Albanians, have been sent to this area against their will and under military control, and have been armed. The number of these refugees varies according to different sources: the Serbian Government speaks of a few thousands, but voted a document saying that the Serbian and Montenegrin population that should go to live in that area should have been 100.000. Furthermore, according to the interviewed Albanians, only homes for refugees and orthodox churches (in an area where only a small minority practices this religion) are being built. All this leads one to think that Serbia would not easily give up their wish to “colonize” the territory, putting into action the programme that had already been elaborated in 1937 by a Serbian scholar, V. Cubrilovic (47). The Albanians report a much higher number of Serbian refugees: according to the Albanian weekly “Koha” there are 16.000, but certainly this process of insertion of refugees hasn’t ended ; on the contrary it’s increasing, and many schools and many handicapped centers, previously used by the population, are now closed in order to host refugees. This means a further danger of the explosion of violence in the area.
Another factor, not at all secondary, which makes the relationship between Serbs and Albanians very unstable and close to explosion in this area, is the state of the relationship between Macedonians and Albanians in the neighbouring Macedonia. Prof. Janjic, of Belgrade University, expert in inter-ethnic relationships, told us: “Serbia may survive without Kosovo, but Macedonia, if it should lose the part inhabited by Albanians (almost half of its territory), risks to disappear as a geo-political entity”. For this reason he believes that the greatest threat of armed conflict comes from this country. Also in Macedonia Albanians have refused to participate in the census and have organised in Tetovo a parallel University that the Macedonian Government doesn’t want to recognize, since it considers it “illegal”. Although Albanians here participated (differently from those living in Kosovo) in the general elections, having their representatives in the Parliament, they generally have the attitude that Macedonians consider “separatist”, all centered on the unification with Albania and the other Albanians. This attitude stimulates the emerging of the problem of the dispersion of Macedonians in various neighbouring countries, too, particularly in Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, Albania, and awakes, among Macedonians, the longing (for the moment repressed) for a “Great Macedonia”.
For this reason Macedonians fear that the creation of an autonomous entity in Kosovo, particularly if it were internationally recognized, as Kosovo Albanians want, would cause the explosion of separatism in their Albanians who would ask to be part of this new state. For all these reasons an armed conflict in Kosovo could not be isolated but would spread over to Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greece, that is all the Southern Balkan area, with unpredictable consequences.
4) Possible solutions
4.1) Division of the territory
This is a solution little spoken of because it would represent a defeat for both conflicting parties, Albanians and Serbs, both actually wishing to possess all the Kosovo territory, or, to use the Serbian expression, of Kos-met (Kosovo-Metohija). Actually this solution is not even based on an ethnical principle, since the area inhabited in majority by Serbs is only a small town in the north of Kosovo: Leposavic. While, on the other side, there are at least three communes, in the south of Serbia, mostly inhabited by Albanians: Bujanovac, Medvedje, Presevo (3, p.13). Therefore, the change of the borders according to the principle of “ethnic purity” (a principle that is totally refused by the Albanian leaders) should regard not only the area where Serbs prevail, but also that where Albanians are in the majority. The proposal made recently by Prof. Janjic (21, pp. 14-15), deriving from considerations formerly expressed by other researchers (3, pp. 12-13), is based not so much on the ethnic principle as on the economical and historical-cultural one.
In North Kosovo there is, in fact, a mining area which, although at present almost totally abandoned, after the Serb occupation and the dismissal of most Albanian workers, is one of the richest in Europe: lead and precious metals (even gold, it’s said) were extracted from it. There was a popular Albanian saying: “Trepça works, Belgrade gets fat”. For these reasons, according to Janjic, the Serbs would never accept losing all of Kosovo, but they could, rather, consider its division, leaving to the Albanians the part lacking in such precious natural resources.
Obviously this solution would become possible only if international pressure on Serbia for a solution to the Kosovo problem were strong enough (which is not currently the case since all European countries, as the present Serbian Government knows very well, have their “skeletons in their closets” and are afraid that an advanced solution to the Kosovo problem might encourage claiming similar solutions to the minority ethnic groups in their own countries (Basques, Irish, Corsicans, etc, and even “Padans”, as they are called by Bossi - compared, at the Italian Embassy in Belgrade, to Rugova!).
The Albanian leadership doesn’t like this solution at all, first of all because it would lead to discussing the present borders and, as Surroi says (28, p. 91), in these cases the only way to definitely decide on division would be through force, which would necessarily lead to an armed conflict. In fact Trepça miners, mostly Albanians, would certainly not accept being included in Serbia and would rebel (this time, probably, not with nonviolence and fasts, as they did in their struggle for the defence of the autonomy of the Region). Besides this, such a division would mean moving hundreds of thousands of inhabitants, which could not easily be done without using arms.
The second reason is that Albanians would be deprived of their richest areas which could lead to the economic revival of the Region, which has always been one of the poorest of former Yugoslavia. Regarding the other reason brought forth by Serbs who propose to divide Kosovo, that is the historical-cultural fact that in this area lie the most important Serbian-Orthodox Monasteries (3,p.13), the Albanians propose to grant to these areas a status of extra-territoriality, and they declare that they want to give birth to a State without an army and with borders open to Serbs, Albanians, Macedonians, Montenegrinos, and to all other peoples.
4.2) A Balkan Confederation?
The idea of a Confederation of the Balkan countries is ancient and frequently rising up in history, and it was the dream of whole generations in these areas (12, pp.72-73). The idea has recently been taken back up by an Italian geo-political journal “Limes”, which calls it the “Euroslavia Project” - and aims at overcoming persisting ethnical conflicts and giving a stable political order to the Balkans. This is how the journal outlines this project: “Under this name we mean a proposal of peace-making and development of the Balkans, based on a geo-political exchange: the gradual mutual reintegration of southern Slavs and other peoples of the area, not touching the borders which resulted after the war, as a necessary condition for their integration into Europe......What other alternative is there? A wall or a number of walls in the middle of Bosnia: on one side former Yugoslavian peoples cast out of Europe forever, and on the other side those waiting, maybe forever, to be included in it as a bothersome appendix. On both sides the logic of the wall would hinder economical development, favour the intollerant, “mafia”, powers, it might provoke new wars. Is this what Slovenians, Croats, Bosnians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Albanians, Hungarians, and all the other peoples who live in post-Yugoslavian Republics want?. We don’t believe so. In any case, it’s necessary that these peoples express their wishes. Nobody has asked them so far. In their place leaders imbibed with the logic of war speak. They owe their fortune to nationalistic propaganda and rich business cultivated in the shadow of war. It’s time that all citizens of those Republics let their voices be heard and choose: Europe or Walls”(18, p. 8).
As far as our limited forces have allowed we have tried to listen to the voices of Serbs, Albanians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, asking them their opinions about this project and this choice. The interviewed persons occupied government or opposition posts, were well-known or less known experts of these problems, or else common people. We interviewed more than one hundred people and with some of them we spoke more than once. We reached these conclusions:
The idea is considered by everybody valuable and worth pursuing. The criticisms regard only the name. The Albanians would feel excluded by such a Confederation even if the journal cites them explicitly, because they are not Slavs and are afraid of such a Confederation that would be dominated by Slavs, since for many years they have been dominated by them as rulers. Therefore they would prefer to consider just a ” Balkan Confederation”.
But they underline that a process of aggregation presupposes free and independent units that can choose to unite. On the contrary, Albanians feel themselves to be under the Serbian yoke, therefore they believe that the first step, without which it would not be possible to undertake the others, is to be able to autonomously choose their own destiny. But they too are favourable for a project that could allow overcoming the limits of actual States and Regions that are felt to be getting narrower and narrower especially if one considers that the economic development of the area requires the passing of borders and customs-offices, which, instead, are increasing. For these reasons, Albanians would like a state without an army and without borders, or, rather, with borders open to Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania. It has been pointed out to us that the peoples who are the most interested in such a project are actually the Albanians and the Macedonians. These peoples, divided among different States, have the greatest interest in such a project because in the Confederation they would find, without making war to try to change the current State borders, that unity and communication which the single States, separate as they are, cannot give them. On the other hand, in such a project for a Confederation even the statute of the single unity becomes less important (whether it’s a recognised state or a region with strong autonomy). What is important is not so much the juridical form, as being able to really decide about one’s own destiny and to be part of a Confederation not through others, but in an autonomous way.
However, we also found, among various people, strong scepticism about the possibility of realizing this project, both because of the hatred accumulated in ethnic groups that have recently fought each other, and because they don’t trust in the fact that Europe and the United States have any real interest in such a process of aggregation. It’s commonly believed that these external interlocutors prefer “divide et impera” (Divide and command) of real-politik, that is to find, each of them, their own space for manoeuvre and for economic interests, rather than wishing such a unity, even as part of the European Union. For these reasons, they like this idea but they think it’s too utopian, which would require a very long time to be reached, maybe centuries, while, on the contrary, they are searching for a quicker solution. But we have also noticed that these problems seem to be more greatly felt in southern Yugoslavia, in Kosovo, in Macedonia, and that such a project may find a partial, but quicker, answer in this area, if European countries and the United States don’t hinder but rather support it.
4.3) Yugoslav Mini-Confederation
This proposal was recently repeated by A. Demaçi, an important Albanian leader (who spent 28 years in jail, also under Tito’s regime, because of his pro-Albanian sympathies, and his involvement in the reunification of this people under the same flag): that is to create a mini-confederation between Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo (35, 9 May 1996, p. 5), which could be included in a more ample project as the one cited above. This proposal seems more realistic than the former because it is similar to other proposals made by Kosovo Albanians who wanted to be recognised as a State, but accepted nonetheless being part of the former Federation. One of the main aims of the Albanian struggle was, in fact, to become the Seventh Republic, besides the six already existing, and this demand was based on the fact that, numerically, they were the third ethnic group of former Yugoslavia (Serbs, Croats, Albanians). Besides this, the proposal would mean giving up forever, or at least putting aside, for the moment, the idea of Kosovo as an independent state that might later unify with Albania in order to give life to that “Great Albania” which is so feared by the Serbs. It also meets the wishes of many inhabitants of Montenegro who feel oppressed in a relationship between the Serbs (8 millions) and themselves (600.000), which makes them little more than an appendix to Serbia. This proposal might be accepted by the current leadership of Albania which seems to view the unification of Kosovo and Albania unfavourably, asking for Kosovo only the restoration of an autonomy like the one it enjoyed under Tito, thanks to the 1974 Constitution.
But, even if this proposal seems more realistic, obstacles and difficulties for its realisation are considerable. The Albanian leadership (both the LDK and other parties) points out that former Yugoslavia no longer exists, and that such a relationship, without any international support or control, would risk keeping them under Serbian domination, which they are not willing to accept. From the Serbian side, moreover, it doesn’t seem that there have been any proposals in this direction. The only proposal, as far as we know, which was expressed in a very veiled and oscure way, is that for a Constitutional Reform of the “Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia”.
This would consist of four provinces (Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina, Kosovo) and an autonomous region of Sanjac. As far as we know, on the basis of articles by the Montenegro weekly “Monitor”, the main elements of this reform, inspired by the German model, would be: 1) the Federation would enjoy greater authority in relation to the single republics and the role of the central institutions would actually be strengthened; 2) the republics would lose their present “state identity”, they would no longer have the characteristics of ”state-members of the Federation”, but only that of “provinces”; 3) the Federation would be formed of 5 parts with different levels of autonomy: Serbia and Montenegro would be recognised as constitutional states, Vojvodina and Kosovo would have less autonomy, and Sanjac even less; 4) the Federal authority would be expressed in a presidential-like system, in which strong powers would lie in the hands of the President, like in the German model cited above; 5) the general political decisions (customs, international tourism, sea-trasports, etc.) including foreign policy, would be centralised (5, p. 10).
According to “Monitor” the discussion necessary to start this constitutional reform should begin with the first meetings between Belgrade and the Albanian leadership of Kosovo. But Albanian sources claim that this discussion has not started yet. It’s not certain, anyway, that this proposal which, for the moment, doesn’t seem to have been accepted even by Montenegrins, would be accepted by the Albanians. It is not, in fact, based on a greater decentralisation, inside which Albanians could find more autonomy, but exactly the opposite: on the increase of centralized power, and this is in total opposition to the wishes of the Albanians.
Another difficulty of the Demaçi proposal comes from Vojvodina. The proposal doesn’t even mention this region, considering only 3 members: Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo. This is realistic. The situation of Kosovo and that of Vojvodina, which were formally treated in a similar way in the 1974 Constitution, are, actually, totally different. In Vojvodina, the Serbian population is the majority (60% before the war). There was a strong Hungarian minority (about 20%) which has been “encouraged” to leave the country and many of them, particularly the young men, in order to avoid entering the Serbian Army, went, in fact, to Hungary or emigrated to other European countries. Besides this, the policy of colonization of the country using Serbian refugees was carried out much more extensively than in Kosovo. In fact settlements of about 150.000 Serbian refugees from Croatia have been reported in that area (4, pp. 18-19). Besides this, while in Kosovo the dissolution of the Parliament and all local institutions connected to the 1974 Constitution was brought about through a military coup surrounding the Parliament with tanks, in Vojvodina this happened without any strong opposition by the local population. For these reasons the way Demaçi distinguished the two regions may be realistic. But, from a historical and formal viewpoint the two regions have always been considered equal and the Serbian Government might not easily accept this distinction.
4.4) Special autonomy
At the present this is the solution most favoured, by diplomatic leaders all over the world, who consider Kosovo as an internal problem of Serbia (53, p. 2) and demand a sort of autonomy similar to that granted by the 1974 Constitution. Also among the pacifists this request is present and widespread. In fact, in a book published by the European University Peace Research Centre, in Schlaining (Austria), in relation to Kosovo it’s stated that the best solution should be found within forms of autonomy. In the essay in the book dealing with this subject, various solutions are compared which have been developed within the area of international law for situations non unlike that of Kosovo. Among these, there is also the example of the Aland Islands which we will examine below. At the end of this analysis, the author reaches this conclusion: “In Kosovo the political situation is so tense that the only feasible hypothesis is that of an internationally protected autonomy. From the point of view of the theory of legal rights, this solution presents no problems, as can be seen in the example of the Kurds in Iraq. It should be established as a coercive measure through a Resolution of the Security Council and be protected with the possibility of sanctions. This solution could be applicable also for Kosovo” (52, p. 246).
Also the Helsinski Citizen Assembly, in a specific seminar on Kosovo, in which Veton Surroi, director of “Koha”, the Albanian Journal of Pristina, participated, mentions this type of solution. In fact, in the final report the following is written: “The solution to the Kosovo problem ..... should consist in progressive institutional and constitutional regulation accompanied by the recognition of interior borders. A statute providing for ample autonomy within the FRY could be established for Kosovo. This transitory solution includes the right to self-determination and the prohibition of secession”. The report continues by pointing out the central importance of the return of a permanent OSCE mission to Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina (the Serbian Government, in fact, as a response to not being accepted as member of that organization, had expelled them), “With an ample mandate for assisting the process of the resolution of conflict quoted above” (50, p.1), and of its choice, for Kosovo, of a “strategy of progressive support”. But the speaker indicates that all this implies an agreement between Rugova and Milosevic which will not be easy to reach : “Is is clear: that an agreement like this will have to be imposed and will not be accepted without resistance”. Resistance that the report expects from both sides, Serbian and Albanian (2., p. 7; 50, p. 1).
An idea of the resistance by Serbs and by Albanians living in Kosovo may also be formulated on the basis of the results of a research conducted on 1015 citizens over 18 years of age in this area which was carried out, this year, from the 28 February to 3 March, by USIA (Unites States Information Agency). The interviewed Serbs, in fact, believe that the problem of the status of Kosovo is “an internal problem of Yugoslavia, and that other countries shouldn’t interfere”, and 67% of them declare they are totally opposed to Kosovo autonomy. On the other side, on the contrary, 81% of the Albanians interviewed declared they are opposed to the option for Kosovo autonomy within Serbia, 92% of them support the independence of Kosovo from Serbia, and 94% of them believe that it’s “worthy dying for” (37, p. 1; 28, p. 93).
In favour of the necessity of finding a solution is the high cost of the military occupation of this region, which reaches about 1% of the Serbian National Income (27, p.30), and also the longing of Serbia, if this is confirmed - but there are contrary voices that see Serbia more interested in gravitating towards their traditional Russian allies - to be fully accepted into Europe.
The problem to be posed is: which type of autonomy? According to Janjic, a well known Belgrade sociologist, the model to consider is that of South Tyrol, in Italy, where German speaking and Italian speaking people (with a Ladin speaking minority) live together. It states that citizens of different ethnical origins, in order “to safeguard the ethnical character and the cultural and economic development” have the right to: a) “primary and secondary teaching in their mother-tongue - Italian or German, but also Ladin (for members of this ethnical group), with the obligation, starting from the second or third elementary class, for Italian and German speaking groups, to learn the other language; b) the use, on an equal basis, of German and Italian in public administration, in official documents, as well as in the toponymy; the use of only Italian inside military institutions remains however; c) the right to re-establish German family names that have been Italianized throughout recent years; d) parity of rights for admission to public offices in order to realize a more satisfactory distribution of jobs between the two ethnic groups”. Besides this, local people are allowed to exercize autonomous legislative and executive power, in common agreement. Particularly, Vice Presidents of the Regional Governing Body belong one to the Italian-speaking group, and the other to the German-speaking one. The composition of this body must correspond to the consistence of linguistic groups as they are represented in the Regional Council. The same proportional representation of linguistic groups is also required for the constitution of the local public administration. Furthermore, the Italian Government, in agreement with the Austrian Government, recognizes the mutual validity of certain educational degrees (particularly for dentists) and permits a free right of way to passengers and goods between North and East Tyrol both by train and by car; it aims to facilitate extensive border traffic and local exchange of a certain quantity of typical products and goods between Austria and Italy (42, pp. 46 and following).
But the Albanians interviewed are not convinced that this model might represent a step forward for the solution of their problem. Their prevailing opinion is, instead, that they had already had all these rights, and even more, granted by the 1974 Constitution, which the Serbs revoked, and that the application of this model to Kosovo would mean, instead of a step forward, a step backward. Anyway, if there were enough pressure and commitment in this direction on behalf of the International Community, they might accept it as a transitory answer, provided that it was clear that it’s a temporary choice, to be overcome in a relatively short period of time (not the 50 years foreseen for the Palestinian State).
During a study seminar on the project of a “Civilian European Peace Corps” held in the Peace-Study Centre of the European University of Schlaining (Austria), a Finnish student spoke of a second model, used for the Aland Islands, which seems to be one of the most advanced in the world. Having received the relative documentation we are able to take into consideration this example as well.
The Aland Islands are composed of one large island and a number of smaller ones, which lie between Sweden, not far from its capital Stockholm, and Finland, quite near to the city of Turku, in this country. A little farther away there are the northern areas of Former Soviet Union: Esthonia and Lithuania. The islands are inhabited by several thousand people, all Swedish- speaking. Historically these islands were part of the Kingdom of Sweden, until 1908/9, when Sweden was obliged, through a peace-treaty, to give up Finland and the Aland Islands to Russia. But, because of their geographical position, right at the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia, in the Baltic Sea, and because of their high strategical value for the nearby countries, even earlier, in 1856, these islands were put under international jurisdiction, and declared a demilitarised and neutral zone. With the division of the Russian Empire (1917), the inhabitants of the islands asked to be re-unified to Sweden. But since the zone had been declared international, the League of the Nations was called on to decide on their destiny. In 1921 the League of Nations Council decided that they should become part of Finland, but with two important limitations on its sovereignty: 1) The Aland inhabitants would be guaranteed protection of their Swedish language, culture, local customs (this means that the official language is Swedish, and that education in public schools is given in that language); 2) The Islands were to be demilitarized and neutral by international agreement (1, p. 12).
The 1921 Convention has been frequently modified (the last change was in 1991, but became effective in 1993) but the fundamental traits of strong local autonomy have always been maintained, and even extended. The autonomous legislation of these islands “provides as great a freedom to manage their internal affairs as is possible with regard to ‘the internal and external security of the country’ “ (1, p. 39). The legislative Assembly of the Islands “ has the right to pass laws in the following spheres: education and culture; the police service; local district administration; health and medical services; social legislation; the postal service; promotion of industry; internal communications; tenancy; the right of broadcasting radio and television programmes” (ibid.). The authors add: “We may say that in these spheres Aland functions in just the same way as a miniature independent state with its own legislation and administrative machinery” (ibid.), The Autonomy Act was adopted by the Parliament of Finland with the approval of the Aland Parliament. It cannot be altered or repealed without the Parliaments of Finland and Aland reaching concurrent decisions (1, p. 38). For these reasons, in commemorating the 70th anniversary of the autonomy, it was stated that Aland has “the strongest legal guarantee for its autonomy which is at all possible” (Ibid.). As a result of Aland having demilitarized and neutralized status, Alanders are exempt from the obligation of performing military service. But they are under obligation to “serve in a corresponding manner in ... lighthouse service or in some other civil administration, in accordance with the statutes of national law”(1, p. 19). The Convention also stipulates that no army, navy or air force belonging to any power whatsoever may remain inside Aland territory; no military installations, operational bases or other facilities for warlike purposes are permitted; the manufacture, import, transit and export of weapons and war materials are also banned, as are banned nuclear arms (1, p.15) . Since 1954 the Alanders also have the right to their own flag, since 1970 they have the right to their own direct representation in the Nordic Council, and since 1993 they also have their own stamps. According to the scholars of this example of autonomy: “Finland has, together with Aland, created a model which can serve in many ways as a prototype for addressing the countless so-called ethnic conflicts existing round the world” (1, p. 4).
Whether this model, certainly much more advanced than that of South Tyrol, can provide a base for the Kosovo problem or not, still has to be evaluated. Certainly this example of autonomy was made possible through the international intervention of the League of the Nations. In the case of Kosovo the solution cannot be left only to the 2 conflicting parties since it concerns not only this limited area but the whole international community. In fact, otherwise, the international community would be obliged to intervene, after a terrible slaughter, as happened in Bosnia, in order to extinguish the fires of war instead of preventing them as may still be possible in this area.
5) European Civil Peace Corps: a possible solution?
We have seen how serious the Kosovo situation is and how great the risk is of an armed conflict which could become even larger than that of Bosnia, since it would necessarily involve all neighbouring countries. We have also seen how the Serbs’ position, considering Kosovo as its internal problem, and that of the Kosovo Albanians, seeking international involvement, are totally opposed. We have also examined the first signals of a passage from a nonviolent struggle, full of sacrifices and endurances for the Albanians, to some armed interventions which, maybe, are just provocations, but which risk causing the situation to explode. Interviewing various people of the conflicting parties we have noticed how all the different solutions proposed, on which no real negotiation has yet started, arouse many problems. In fact, either they need armed intervention to be carried out, like, for example, that of dividing the territory; or they are ideal but, at this moment, utopian, like that of a Balkan Confederation; or they are in contrast with the Serbian Government’s wishes, and the historical-juridical traditions of the country, like that of a Mini Yugoslav Confederation; and finally, because the “special autonomy” that would correspond more to the wishes of the Albanians and might, eventually, be accepted by them, like that of the Aland Islands, might not easily be accepted by the Serbs (also because of differences between the two territories, since we know of no Finnish minorities living on those islands, although certainly some families have emigrated to Aland from Finland, while in Kosovo there is a Serbian minority, calculated, by the Serbs, in 1991 at 9,9%, which is totally opposed, as we have seen, to the autonomy of the region). Moreover, the solution of the Aland Islands was made possible through the direct intervention of the League of Nations, that is of an international organization which is the direct antecedent of the United Nations. And also on this point we see that there is a split: Serbs don’t want intervention from outside while Albanians constantly request this.
We interviewed our interlocutors of the different sides on this topic as well. The Serbian Governmental interlocutors are very precise: they want no external mediation. The problem belongs to them and it’s up to them to solve it. But no step seems to have been taken to really start a dialogue - except some signs of opening, like that of permitting Kosovo Albanians to go to Albania without a Yugoslav visa (which, anyway, was a juridical absurdity, in total opposition to democratic principles). The Serbian opposition, the Albanian counterpart and all the scholars interviewed have, on the contrary, declared that there can be no solution to the problem if the international community doesn’t intervene and oblige the Serbian Government to negotiate. But, on the other side, the Albanians (if not specified, we refer to those of Kosovo) declared that, in order to open a real dialogue on an equal basis with the Government of Belgrade, besides the intervention of the international community, or at least of an authoritative foreign country recognized by the conflicting parties as a third party, the demilitarisation of Kosovo and the departure of the Serbian military forces who occupy the territory is necessary. But the Serbian inhabitants are totally opposed because they fear revenge from the Albanians. In order to protect them from such risks, even if the choice of the great majority of Albanians for a nonviolent strategy makes this risk almost non-existent, the demilitarisation of Kosovo should be connected with the arrival of neutral persons who guarantee and promote a calm atmosphere and a distension leading to dialogue between the two parties. Intervention of the armed forces under the command of the United Nations and, even more the Nato Forces, would be considered, by the Serbian population, and also by at least part of the Albanians, as a dangerous intrusion. And, as happened in other areas it might cause the start of an armed conflict, and not a solution to the problem. That’s why the idea of the intervention in Kosovo of a European Civil Peace Corps, which the former South Tyrol European Deputee, Alex Langer, promoted and that we are trying to bring to life, and which should be carried out in close contact with United Nations organs, is very favourably accepted both by non-governmental Serbs, and by Albanians. An Albanian sociologist of Pristina University said: “the ethnic origin doesn’t matter, all peace-loving people not only of Kosovo but also of Serbia would be happy with this kind of intervention!” (28, pp. 68-70). And a Serbian jurist of the University of Belgrade said: “It’s the only possible solution to this problem; without such external intervention Milosevic will never accept solving the Kosovo problem in an adequate way “ (28, pp. 53-55). Belgrade’s “Women in Black” also declared their approval, as did the Antiwar Centre of that town, the Belgrade Circle, and all the Albanian political forces that we could meet, as well as the humanitarian organizations working in this area.
But what activities should be carried out by such a Corps in an area like the one described? In close cooperation with the OSCE mission, which should come back to Kosovo as soon as possible, and in close contact with Non Governmental Organizations that already work in this area, they should:
1) monitor the respect of human rights both by Serbs and by Albanians;
2) encourage occasions for dialogue and open confrontation between parties in conflict in order to seek for just, nonviolent solutions, not only at the top level, but also at the base; and to monitor the implementation of mutually agreed solutions;
3) help the recovery of economical, social, cultural life in this area, encouraging and enabling all Albanians to go back to their jobs from which they had been dismissed;
4) help the return to Kosovo of all the young men who emigrated in order not to perform military service - helping them to obtain the right to be exempted from military service -; help the return of people or families who emigrated because they felt threatened or because they did not have an adequate income;
5) help to organize elections to allow the population of the area to express their will in relation to the future of this region.
But the most important thing is not to delay this intervention any further. The situation is extremely tense and a delay could be fatal. As Danilo Dolci said: “Do something quickly and well, otherwise people will die”. At any rate this intervention could start gradually, with a small nucleus of well prepared people who start to work in this area and who can call in others according to need.
On the other hand, it’s also necessary that such an intervention does not provide an excuse in order not to undertake, at the European Community level, more radical political choices (for example for the organization of an International Conference concentrating specifically on the problem of Kosovo, as requested by the Albanian leadership; or regarding a possible Confederation of Southern Balkan areas; or the recognition of the educational degrees of “parallel schools”).
I would like to close with a quotation from the book on the Aland Islands that we mentioned before: “The concept of National sovereignty, that is, one state- one people, has proved difficult to apply in a world of many cultures characterized to a great extent by ethnic conflicts, not least in Europe. When ethnic problems can no longer be solved by forming states, new forms of co-existence must be found, guaranteeing ethnic groups’ security and identity. Interest in alternative solutions has thus been steadily increasing, and Aland has come to represent a model of a successful solution to a minority problem. Aland’s demilitarized, neutralized status is also attracting more and more international interest in the search for new and new-old forms and means of peaceful solutions to conflicts. In “An Agenda for Peace” the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, points to demilitarized zones as a form of preventive deployment and a means of separating potential belligerants for the purpose of removing any pretext for attack. In that way, according to Mr. Boutros-Ghali, demilitarized zones could serve as symbols of the international community’s concern that conflict be prevented” (1, p. 24).
We hope that this warning, on the importance of the prevention of conflict, may be seriously taken into consideration by the European Community and that the economic interests of single countries in the partition of the Balkan market taking a concern only in one’s own business (which seems to be evidenced by the haste with which many countries formally recognized the FRY, without first taking into account the solution of the problem of Kosovo) may be put aside for a moment, in order to let the world-wide collective interest in a just peace and in the prevention of a new war prevail. We hope that this may lead to rapid resolutive intervention in this situation which is so worthy of support and that, in this way, the opinion of many Albanians will not be confirmed: that the international comunity, Europe in particular, understands only the language of arms (and, it may be added, economic interests) and not the language of peace and of nonviolence.
Pristina 23 May 1996
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