Kosovo: The power of
compromise
![](Aleksandar Mitic, Kosovo the power of compromise_file/amitic.jpg)
By
Aleksandar Mitic, TFF
Associate
September 21,
2006
A Serbian journalist and TFF
Associate argues that only a genuine compromise over Kosovo's future
status can guarantee stability. A true, balanced, and negotiated
compromise on Kosovo's future status would swing the pendulum of Balkan
stability towards the European path.
A manipulated, one-sided, and imposed decision would, however,
open a Pandora's box of secessionist movements in the world and release
the ghosts of a nationalist past in the Balkans. As we approach the
beginning of talks on the future status of the Kosovo province, it becomes
crucial to grasp the full complexity of the Kosovo status issue. There
has been an attempt in the last year and a half to close down
international debate before the status talks had even begun by suggesting
that only independence is a viable solution for Kosovo. The truth is,
the issue of Kosovo's status is dependent on so many historical, legal,
political, religious, economic, and demographic elements that it deserves,
at the very least, a wide international debate on possible solutions and
their implications. To argue thus that only one solution is possible is
not only flawed reasoning, but a dangerous and explosive recipe for future
frustration, tension, and conflict. There has also been an attempt to
refocus and spin the talks in the direction of Kosovo's independence, from
those who say that these are not really talks on the future status but
rather on the terms of Kosovo's future independence to those who argue
that the negotiations should be only about the position of the Kosovo
Serbs in an independent Kosovo. Some also argued that
the talks will be about finding a way to impose independence upon
Belgrade. While there are a few officials who have, often privately rather
than publicly, indicated their preference for such approaches, it must be
said that these are completely contrary to international law.
RISKY
BUSINESS
The aim of the talks
on Kosovo's future status is to finally provide a fair, stable, long-term
solution for this crisis region. The majority Kosovo Albanians must get a
maximum of opportunity and real means to manage their future without
feeling threatened, but also without endangering the welfare of Kosovo
Serbs and other non-Albanians. The interests of Serbia, of which Kosovo is
a part, the stability of the Balkans, and the worldwide impact of these
negotiations are also crucial factors which must be taken into
account. Within the principles of international law and the preset
recommendations of the international community's informal "Contact Group"
- no return to the pre-1999 Milosevic-era situation, no joining of
neighboring states, no partition - a number of possible solutions for the
future status of Kosovo deserve to be examined. There is also a number
of pre-conditions for successful talks that must be met: artificial
deadlines such as end of 2006 must not be used to the detriment of a sound
solution; and the outcome should be an agreed, negotiated compromise, not
an imposed, one-sided decision. The breaching of international law and
the creation of worldwide precedents should be avoided for the sake of
regional and world security. In this regard, it is of paramount
importance that double standards must not be allowed to win over universal
standards. To claim that the Kosovo situation features "unique"
characteristics and that its independence would not represent a precedent
for triggering other crises elsewhere in the world is unlikely to convince
everyone in the international community. What is it that makes Kosovo
so unique? Ten years of institutional discrimination? Several thousand
victims of a conflict between a repressive state security force and a
separatist guerilla force? A majority ethnic group actively seeking
independence? But the very same characteristics are shared by dozens of
similar regions around the world. If every such case is seen as unique,
international law becomes irrelevant. Independence for Kosovo would
indeed be a risky, unilaterally-imposed and ultimately wrong solution. Why
would one side get it all, the other one lose all? Why reward seven years
of Albanian violence in post-war Kosovo? Why break up Serbia, the most
ethnically diverse country in the Western Balkans and create a second
ethnic-Albanian state on one part of its territory? Where is the logic of
European integration in this pursuit of Balkanization of the
Balkans?
A BLUFFER'S GUIDE TO
INDEPENDENCE
Bluffs and spin must not be used as arguments. To say, for example,
that Serbia already lost Kosovo in 1999 is only an interpretation and does
not stand in any single international document, let alone in the UN Security Council
resolution 1244 that ended the conflict.
In the resolution, "self-governing" is mentioned three times,
"self-government" four times, "self-administration" once, "substantial
autonomy" three times, whereas neither "self-determination" nor
"independence" are mentioned at all. Did NATO intervene in 1999 to protect
human rights or to provide the basis for secession? If Kosovo was lost to
Serbia in 1999, why did it not obtain independence then?
As far as the so-called moral argument that it is the violence of
former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic which lost Kosovo for Serbia,
the Kosovo Albanians should be least inclined to favor it since their
massive and systematic violence and repression of the Serb community in
the last seven post-war years has taken all the "moral credit" out of
their hands.
The same goes for the often heard assertion that
Serbia should choose between Kosovo and the European Union. In fact, under
the EU Thessaloniki agenda on the Western Balkans, Serbia has a clear
European perspective and as the Western Balkans' largest country, it
certainly won't remain a black hole inside the EU. To suggest that Serbia
should give up a large part of its territory - which has been the cradle
of its civilization, culture, and religion for nine centuries now - for
the sake of possibly entering a supranational integration process two or
three years earlier does not make much sense. No international or domestic
campaign aimed at convincing Serbian public opinion on this one would
succeed.
One of the most common arguments for the independence of
Kosovo is that if the ethnic Albanians do not get what they want, they
will stage mass violence against the Serbs, other non-Albanians, and the
international troops. The argument points to the massive riots in March
2004 as a warning of what could happen if ethnic Albanian desires are not
satisfied. But is the world really so afraid of such threats that it does
not dare stand up to them? NATO seems ready to call this bluff. The
Alliance's Secretary-General has warned on several occasions that violence
as means of promoting political objectives in the status talks would this
time be met with a robust response from 17,000 NATO troops in the
province. Indeed, threats of violence must not be legitimized nor used as
arguments.
Finally, it is most worrying to suggest that some sort
of "conditional independence" should be the outcome of the status talks.
This empty formula is even presented by some as a compromise solution,
because ethnic Albanians will have to wait a few more years for
independence and give up on the idea of Greater Albania. Many of its
backers suggest "conditional independence" means that Kosovo will be
granted independence in phases, provided the majority ethnic Albanians
finally start respecting the human rights of the Serbs and other
non-Albanians. But this option is an insult to negotiators and
21st-century human-rights standards. If Belgrade is resolutely opposed to
immediate independence, why would it accept independence two or three
years from now? If even the most basic standards of human rights are not
respected under international supervision, why should we expect that they
would be in a conditionally independent Kosovo? And doesn't the
"conditional independence" concept introduce a new kind of trade-off:
respect for human rights in exchange for territory?
COMPROMISE: A WIN-WIN
SOLUTION
Looking at the situation realistically and
fairly, the most sustainable and just solution for the future status of
the province lies between the standard type of autonomy, which ethnic
Albanians now reject, and independence, which clashes with international
law and is unacceptable for the Serbs in general and Serbia as a
state. A solution that would provide for a maximum of autonomy for
Kosovo within the borders of Serbia could satisfy all the legitimate
demands, including the Kosovo Albanians' demand to be self-governing, and
it can protect the interests of non-Albanians in Kosovo and the interests
of Serbia as a state. Such a solution would also comply with the principle
of the inviolability of international borders. Kosovo would enjoy full
legislative, executive, and judicial capacity, a limited external
representation - in particular regarding its full direct access to the
international financial institutions - and most importantly, normalized
relations with Serbia. On the other hand, Serbia still has many
positive things to offer Kosovo, including a strong push in its
macroeconomic revival, a common market for goods, an integrated energy,
electricity and infrastructure network, access to its health and education
systems, a common fight against organized crime, and a joint contribution
to regional stability and European integration. At the same time, an
autonomous Kosovo would still need to improve its treatment of the Kosovo
Serbs and other non-Albanians. A wide-scale decentralization including a
horizontal linkage of Serbian municipalities, which would benefit from the
education, social, and health system of central Serbia, is a precondition
for the survival of Kosovo Serbs, as suggested by UN special envoy Kai
Eide.
This horizontal linkage is not a model for partition and
conflict but, on the contrary, a model for integration and survival, as
these municipalities would be fully integrated in the autonomous Kosovo
system run from Pristina, while keeping some political links with
Belgrade. Considering all this, an autonomy for the Kosovo Serbs within
a maximum autonomy for Kosovo inside Serbia appears as the most reasonable
and viable long-term solution.
A WIN-WIN
SOLUTION
More than anything, it is a win-win
solution. The Kosovo Albanians would finally get the means to manage their
future and so will the Kosovo Serbs; Serbia would not have its borders
changed and its historical and religious cradle amputated; Macedonia and
Bosnia will receive guarantees that border changes in the Balkans are no
longer tolerated; the EU would obtain regional stability and be able fully
to take charge of its European perspective; the United States would be
able to disengage its troops without losing its diplomatic leverage in
both Pristina and Belgrade; Russia, China, India, and many other countries
in the world would appreciate not having to deal with a dangerous
secessionist precedent; the UN will see a major crisis issue resolved
peacefully and with full respect for international law. It is time to
respect international law; it is time to find a long-term solution for
Kosovo; it is high time to be patient, fair, sound, and consistent. It
is time for a successful compromise for the first time in Kosovo's long
history.
Aleksandar Mitic is a Brussels-based journalist and one of the
authors of the CD-ROM and Internet project Kosovo 2006: The Making of a
Compromise.
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2006
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